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Introduction  
 
 
United States Vice President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev 
walked quickly through the model home, both men tired after a full day of engaging in a series of 
public debates.1 Suddenly the two politicians stopped as Nixon drew Khrushchev into the model 
kitchen.  
“I want to show you this kitchen,” he said, gesturing to a washing machine. “See that 
built-in washing machine?”  
Khrushchev quickly countered, “We have such things.”2  
 
So began the infamous “Kitchen Debate,” in which Nixon and Khrushchev engaged in a 
deliberation about the merits of capitalism versus communism while gesticulating to various 
household items. As the men stood in the kitchen, a circle of reporters and photographers 
surrounded them, leaning on every word, recording the exchange that would come to 
characterize a new era in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.  
The Kitchen Debate has become one of the most iconic moments of the Cold War. While 
many accounts of the words that passed between the politicians exist, the backdrop to the debate 
is less often discussed. Where were Khrushchev and Nixon while they debated? The location is 
equally as important as the words themselves. This conversation was a concrete manifestation of 
the ideological conflict that existed between these two nations, but the space itself was also a 
                                                
1 Harrison E. Salisbury, “Nixon and Khrushchev Argue in Public as U.S. Exhibit Opens; Accuse Each Other of 
Threats,” New York Times, July 25, 1959. 
2 William Safire, “The Cold War’s Hot Kitchen,” The New York Times, July 23, 2009 
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silent and ever-present actor in this political debate. Outside of the model kitchen, a multi-storied 
exhibition stretched on, surrounding the debating politicians on all sides. 
 In 1959, the American government, with the help of numerous designers, architects, and 
curators, harnessed the power of visual propaganda in the creation of the American National 
Exhibition in Moscow. It was within this space that Nixon and Khrushchev debated. The kitchen 
was situated inside of the model home on the ground floor of one of the main exhibition 
buildings. It was a kaleidoscope of consumer goods and culture meant to show advances in 
American technology and prove to Soviet citizens the immense freedom of choice that the 
American people had. 
  As a propaganda tool, the 1959 exhibition employed the aesthetics of modern art and 
design to send a specific message to the Soviet Union and the world about American 
exceptionalism. At this point in the Cold War, the exhibition of culture was as powerful as the 
threat of any nuclear weapon. The exhibit attempted to carve out a bastion of American-ness in 
the heart of the Soviet Union. Built and conceived by American designers who were working on 
the cusp of design innovation, the exhibition featured the American lifestyle, advances in 
technology, as well as a large display of work by American modern artists. The context of the 
exhibition was a concerted attempt to display the “best of” American art, culture, and 
technological advances in a format that emphasized freedom and democracy, but also power and 
American cultural preeminence.  
The American National Exhibition was a vibrant and dynamic example of cultural 
diplomacy. This display of culture generated strong reactions and drew excited crowds. In a 
photograph taken in the art section of the exhibition, crowds gather in the gallery. Their backs 
are turned to the photographer, their bodies pressed up against each other and the art, necks 
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craning to get a look at the pieces. In the center of the frame, a young man has been caught mid-
turn by the photographer’s film, and as he pivots away from his still-captivated countrymen, he 
makes eye-contact with the camera. His facial expression is arresting—conveying strong 
emotion in a split second. A viewer today cannot know what this young man is thinking, but the 
intensity of his gaze is enough to make one pause and consider.  What was going through his 
mind at the moment this photo was taken? Perhaps his face shows surprise at the content of the 
exhibition, perhaps shock, concern, the possibility of new ideas, or exposure to the new ways of 
visualizing the world. This photo illustrates the unique relationship between a viewer and an 
object in an art gallery. In this boy’s facial expression, we see the intent of the exhibition 
reflected. He has not stumbled across the painting by chance; this is a cultural encounter that has 
been carefully orchestrated.   
The arrangement of art in the exhibition and the architecture of the space emphasized 
certain artists and works as well as the themes of freedom and democracy. The goal of the 
exhibition and the U.S. government was to insert itself and the image of American freedom into 
the moment of discovery that the exhibition had afforded this young man and the other visitors to 
the exhibition. In the photograph, the man’s head is framed by Grant Wood’s Pastor Weems’ 
Fable (1940), which depicts the oft-told American tale of a young George Washington chopping 
down the cherry tree. In the painting, the upright Pastor Weems holds back a painted curtain 
revealing the scene of the ‘crime’ with a stern expression on his face. It is this face we can see 
peeking over the shoulder of the young Russian man, as if it were a reminder of the principles 
upon which America was founded. To the right of Pastor Weems Fable hangs Jackson Pollock’s 
Cathedral, mostly obscured by the crowd. The dynamic and expressive paint splatters of 
Cathedral contrast sharply with the white walls of the exhibition making the visual impact of the 
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piece undeniable. This effect is reflected in the face of the young man—his raised eyebrows, 
wide eyes and open mouth.  
The juxtaposition of the elements in this photograph emphasize the influence that the art 
exhibition had on those who viewed it. This exhibition was a tool of propaganda, and in this 
moment we are perhaps seeing an instance of an exposure to a new idea. This is the goal that the 
United States government had in mind when they made the decision (one that was predicated on 
at least a decade of earlier cultural diplomacy initiatives in the years following World War II) to 
send modern art abroad as a cultural weapon of the Cold War. Pollock and Wood did not paint 
with this specific propagandistic goal in mind, but this did not mean their work was immune to 
appropriation and interpretation. In this exhibition of modern American art, the arrangement of 
the art on the gallery walls was done for more than just visual effect.  
The creation of the exhibition was in itself a propagandistic event that can be considered 
and analyzed like any work of art or piece of political propaganda. The entire design of the 
exhibition was meant to impress, awe, and convince. In addition to displaying modern art, the 
exhibition employed design elements rooted in the tradition avant-garde artistic movements. The 
exhibition’s propagandist power lay in its design. The significance of this is two-fold. For one, 
the design draws on traditional avant-garde aesthetics and influences, placing the actions of the 
United States in the realm of governments making use of modern art to promote political 
ideology—not an uncommon phenomenon. Secondly, a close visual and spatial analysis of the 
design components reveals the authority that any exhibition space exerts on its viewer. In the 
case of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, this perspective holds true and is essential 
to understanding the propaganda effect of the exhibition, and more importantly, to investigating 
the methods in which this propaganda was successfully installed through modernist, avant-garde 
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aesthetics. An investigation of this relationship between propaganda and the avant-garde is 
important because it provides a tool with which to redefine the way that the United States 
government promoted ideals of democracy and freedom abroad during the Cold War. Though the 
ideology being promoted during the Moscow exhibition was democratic and free, it was not 
necessarily being promoted in a democratic and free manner.  
In the instance of this specific exhibition, analysis of art and design demonstrates the 
importance of comparisons with other political powers that make use of art as propaganda. In 
using art as an instrument of propaganda during the 1959 American National Exhibition in 
Moscow, the actions of the United States government mirrored authoritarian regimes like the 
Soviet Union. The U.S. and USSR both appropriated artistic styles in the service of the 
propagation of their ideologies. By using modern art and the aesthetics of avant-garde design to 
aid in the spread of democracy and American freedom, the U.S. government acted in the 
tradition of totalitarian governments. For example, Hitler in Germany, Mussolini in Italy, and 
Stalin in Russia all harnessed art in some form or another to promote the power of their regimes.  
 I want to be clear here about what I mean by totalitarianism, and why I make this 
comparison. In employing the term “totalitarianism,” I refer to a system of government 
characterized by the leader and the state’s complete control over society. In a totalitarian regime, 
the public and the private, as well as the political, economic, cultural, and social aspects of 
society must be completely regulated and in line with the ruling power’s ideology. I am not 
arguing that the American Cold War government was a totalitarian state. Although the basic 
tenets of American democracy were still in place at this time, what could be considered 
totalitarian tendencies and practices did exist in the actions of the United States government. 
These actions and tendencies come to light in an examination of the art and design displayed and 
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built for the 1959 exhibition in Moscow. Similar to the “inverted totalitarianism” argument of 
political theorist Sheldon Wolin, I argue that these tendencies are sometimes imperceptible and 
not premeditated, however, they are “totalizing in the sense that they are obsessed with control, 
expansion, superiority, and supremacy.”3 As Igor Golomstock writes, looking for characteristics 
of totalitarianism in western democracy is like, “looking for the intent of ice in cold water. It is 
indisputably there, nevertheless, ice and water are two distinct conditions of society.”4 The 
organizers of the American National Exhibition did not promote a totalitarian agenda toward art 
or attempt to stifle creative freedom in the harsh manner that often occurred in these dictatorial 
states. However, the actions of the United States must be considered in this context, because the 
end goal—that of conveying a propagandistic message through the visual—was essentially the 
same, demonstrating methodical attempts to present and sustain a particular world view, and 
distinctive imperial purpose.  
 The United States after World War II was a global power and saw itself as such. It was 
the era of the “American Century.” As Henry Luce argued in his well-known piece outlining the 
elements of American ascendency in the twentieth century, it was America’s time to “be the 
powerhouse from which the ideals spread throughout the world can do their mysterious work of 
lifting the life of mankind from the level of the beasts to what the Psalmist called a little lower 
than the angels.”5 Written in 1941, this piece demonstrates the attitude that fueled the war years, 
and consequently the cold war that followed. During World War II, the centralized state power 
of the United States reached an apex, and did not dissipate in the years following.  
                                                
3 Sheldon Wolin, Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 10. 
4 Igor Golomshtok, Totalitarian Art: In the Soviet Union, the Third Reich, Fascist Italy and the People’s Republic of 
China (Overlook Press, 2011). 
5 Henry Luce, “The American Century,” Life Magazine, February 17, 1941, 68. 
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The idea that cultural diplomacy needed to be somehow divorced from official 
government policy in order to preserve the ideals of freedom, was deeply ingrained in American 
thinking prior to World War II. However, official American cultural diplomacy initiatives that 
continued into the Cold War were first established during World War II as a response to 
aggressive propaganda efforts produced by countries like Nazi Germany. As part of the war 
effort, there was a need to respond in kind to this propaganda, but a concern that if culture 
became a tool for the government, there would be a loss of democratic integrity. As Rosenberg 
writes, “the dilemma of how to disseminate an unofficial official culture was never resolved.”6 
This dilemma would continue to play out during the Cold War, and is at the core of the tension 
and controversy that existed over discussions of government sponsorship of the arts for cultural 
diplomacy purposes. Diplomatic officials in the United States worked under the assumption that 
if they were promoting freedom, then, “a cultural policy closely linked to these diplomatic goals 
was less objectionable than the cultural diplomacy of other nations.”7 
As such, in the climate of World War II, a path was opened up for the intense 
propagation of American culture abroad by various government agencies.8 These organizations 
and methods did not disappear at the end of the war, but rather morphed into new forms. 
President Eisenhower, a strong proponent of “psychological warfare,” appreciated the power of 
cultural diplomacy and propaganda efforts.9 The United States Information Agency (USIA), was 
created by Eisenhower in 1953 to disseminate American cultural information across the globe, 
and, as Rosenberg writes, “the government became increasingly committed to the free-flow 
                                                
6 Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion 1890-1945 (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 205  
7 Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream, 206 
8 Ibid  
9 Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public 
Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 82.  
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doctrine of cultural exchange that would keep the world open to Americanizing influences.”10 
The American National Exhibition in Moscow would be one of the agency’s largest and most 
expansive undertakings, solidifying the relationship between government and culture. 
 The typical American narrative of the Cold War relies on extreme polarization between 
two sides. The promotion of American exceptionalism during the Cold War through agencies 
like the USIA, posited the United States and democracy as “good” and the Soviet Union and 
communism as “evil.” In the role of “good,” the United States government, as an advocate for 
democracy and freedom, had room to maneuver. By creating an “us” versus “them,” “good” 
versus “evil” situation, space was made for undemocratic activity. The end products: democracy, 
freedom, no communism, economic and cultural influence, was more important than the means 
of getting there. By simply calling the standoff between democracy and communism a “war,” 
albeit one that was cold, a space was opened up for any activity that would help win the “war.” 
When proof of secretly funded CIA activities promoting American interests and culture came out 
in the 1960s, Thomas W. Braden, former CIA official and journalist, defended allegations of the 
CIA’s “immorality” by using this argument: “For the cold war was and is a war, fought with 
ideas instead of bombs. And our country has had a clear-cut choice, either we win the war or we 
lose it.”11 
 This thesis is not an examination of the many covert CIA sponsored art initiatives that 
were a part of the Cold War.12 The American National Exhibition was openly sponsored by the 
US State Department. However, the very existence of this covert activity illuminates an 
                                                
10 Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream, 228 
11 Thomas Braden, “I’m Glad the CIA Is Immoral,” Saturday Evening Post, May 20, 1967, 14. 
12 Eva Cockcroft discusses the implications of CIA sponsored art in her 1974 piece “Abstract Expressionism, 
Weapon of the Cold War.” Frances Stonor Saunders has detailed these covert actions in her extensive book, The 
Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters.  
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important point about the United States government’s relationship with culture. The argument 
was that the CIA had to secretly sponsor exhibitions of modern art because they would never 
pass muster in a conservative congress. The fact that the CIA went to such great lengths to make 
these exhibitions happen demonstrates the faith they put in the power of cutting-edge, 
contemporary art to spread the American dream and prove that American was not only a global 
economic power, but a cultural one as well. The American National Exhibition was conceived in 
this climate. Strict dividing lines between democracy and totalitarian control characterized Cold 
War ideology, and to some extent these dividing lines have been preserved in the historical study 
of the Cold War. It is easy to assume that because the United States government was promoting 
democracy, the agencies that were assigned to spread this American doctrine, such as the CIA 
and the USIA were doing so in a free and purely democratic fashion. We now know that this was 
not the case, as covert CIA operations and American support of world leaders with questionable 
human rights records during the Cold War years have come to light.13  
In the particular case of the American National Exhibition in Moscow however, it is not 
at first obvious how the story of the exhibition might fit in with un-democratic actions. We have 
to realize that the American National Exhibition, while it promoted freedom, democracy, and 
capitalism, was not necessarily a free space. In its role as a propaganda event meant to persuade, 
the spatial layout and visual elements of the exhibition did not leave room for other opinions and 
subtly laid out a specific ideology of American exceptionalism. Additionally, in appropriating 
the style of the avant-garde for the purposes of the state, the American National Exhibition can 
                                                
13 For example Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam in 1954. For a detailed account of covert CIA actions that have 
come to light after the Cold War, see James Callanan’s Covert Action in the Cold War. As Callanan writes, “Rather 
than choosing the best man for the job, the CIA often found itself limited to picking…the best of a bad bunch” 
(184). 
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be and should be understood in the same category as previous propaganda exhibitions of 
European totalitarian states.  
 Why was the U.S. State Department so interested in using art for propaganda purposes? 
Why modern art especially? It is important to make the distinction that the art in the American 
National Exhibition was appropriated in the service of state propaganda, rather than explicitly 
created for this purpose. In Art Power, Boris Groys argues that “art becomes politically effective 
only when it is made beyond or outside the art market—in the context of direct political 
propaganda. Such art was made in the former Socialist countries.”14 However, art is not only 
politically effective when it is created with a propagandistic message in mind. Art becomes 
politically effective when a government appropriates and co-opts it in the service of a 
propaganda message, regardless of whether or not the artwork was originally created with a 
political or propagandistic intention. This idea extends to the appropriation of entire artistic 
styles and movements, such as the aesthetics of the avant-garde that were central to the American 
National Exhibition in Moscow. As Groys writes, “the art that is put in service of such a dynamic 
revolutionary balance of power takes necessarily the form of political propaganda.”15 
When powerful regimes use art for political and social gain, we can interrogate this 
action—the appropriation of art—to better understand history, art, and dynamics of power. In 
1954, author Hellmut Lehmann-Haupt wrote Art Under a Dictatorship in which he outlined the 
ways that the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany used artistic expression for ideological motives. It 
is a forceful call to action, a stringent reminder that art is to be taken seriously, because taken 
into the wrong hands it can be a dangerous tool. He writes, “one of the reasons so many people 
find it difficult to take these things seriously is an ingrained indifference to art, a traditional 
                                                
14 Boris Groys, Art Power (MIT Press, 2008), 6. 
15 Ibid 
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reluctance to accept art as a direct social force of extraordinary magnitude.”16 In the study of 
history, we must accept art as a direct social force of extraordinary magnitude. The history of art 
and culture is not any less significant than political and social history, and one cannot be fully 
understood without the other; they are inextricably linked. This thesis seeks to present a narrative 
of an often-told Cold War story—that of political propaganda—and re-frame it using a cultural 
lens. Through an analysis of the exhibition of art and culture that occurred in Moscow in 1959, it 
is possible to redefine the typical story of American exceptionalism during the Cold War. 
More recently a number of historians have focused their studies on the intersection of 
culture and politics. Work done by historian Penny Von Eschen on U.S. State Department 
sponsored Cold War jazz tours abroad provides a methodological and analytical framework for 
studies of cultural diplomacy. Von Eschen’s work reinforces the main tenet of this thesis—the 
significance of studying the history of culture not in a vacuum, but in conversation with political, 
economic, social, and global factors. Von Eschen conclusively demonstrates that the separation 
of culture and politics in historical analysis has prevented a deep and meaningful understanding 
of the role the United States took on after World War II. 17 This new role that the United States 
defined for itself was predicated on ideals like Henry Luce’s “American Century,” that promoted 
American exceptionalism and imperialism in all aspects of U.S interactions abroad. Von 
Eschen’s work has influenced scholars like Claire Croft, who analyzes State Department dance 
tours. Croft’s use of dance as a mode of analysis is an important example of how a cultural 
phenomenon can be used to enhance understanding of a pre-existing historical narrative. Croft 
goes beyond describing dance as a powerful tool of cultural diplomacy and propaganda, making 
                                                
16 Hellmut Lehmann Haupt, Art: Under a Dictatorship (Oxford University Press, 1954), xviii. 
17 Penny Von Eschen, “Duke Ellington Plays Baghdad: Rethinking Hard and Soft Power from Inside Out” in 
Contested Democracy: Freedom, Race, and Power in American History (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2012). 279-300 
. 
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use of the language of dance—the dancers’ bodies and choreography—to provide a deep analysis 
of U.S diplomatic policy. Like Von Eschen, Croft takes issue with the binaries of political and 
cultural diplomacy. Challenging Joseph Nye’s definitions of “hard power” and “soft power” both 
Von Eschen and Croft argue that these definitions place culture as “separate from and perhaps 
less than political or economic diplomacy”18 and that this “remains an obstacle to understanding 
American culture as well as the exercise of U.S. power in the world.”19 This thesis seeks to 
reside in a similar sphere as Von Eschen and Croft’s analyses and demonstrate that the political 
and cultural aspects driving the American National Exhibition were interlinked. In this event, an 
understanding of cultural aspects uniquely enhances our understanding of the political.   
The American National Exhibition in Moscow has been studied from many different 
angles, mostly in terms of political propaganda. Most recently Andrew Wulf has contributed a 
museum studies perspective to the current understanding of the event, analyzing the exhibition 
and its design.20 He delves deep into the factors that went into planning and creating the 
exhibition, examining the way that design was used as a political force. His in-depth look at the 
design of the exhibition as well as the influences and motives of the lead designers, sheds 
significant light on the processes by which the exhibition came about.  
Even so, more can be added to a close analysis of the space of the exhibition. As such, 
Wulf starts the work that I seek to build on in this paper, namely that of analyzing the actual 
aesthetic qualities of the exhibition. In addition, Mary Anne Staniszewski’s scholarship on the 
history of exhibition design at the Museum of Modern Art provides an invaluable framework for 
                                                
18 Claire Croft, Dancers as Diplomats: American Choreography in Cultural Exchange (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 18. 
19 Von Eschen, Duke Ellington Plays Baghdad, 281. 
20 Andrew James Wulf, U.S. International Exhibitions during the Cold War: Winning Hearts and Minds through 
Cultural Diplomacy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015). 
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the analysis of exhibition design “as an aesthetic medium and historical category.” 
Staniszewski’s work is groundbreaking, in that she closely analyzes the exhibition as a medium 
in and of itself, a part of art history that is often overlooked. Staniszewski argues that,  
“Exhibitions, like the artworks themselves, represent what can be described as conscious 
and unconscious subjects, issues, and ideological agendas. Their unconscious, or less 
obvious visible, aspects can be understood as manifestations of historical limitations and 
social codes. One effective strategy for seeing these often overlooked yet extremely 
powerful dimensions of art exhibitions is to analyze their installation designs.”21 
 
By acknowledging the power dynamics that exist in the space of an art exhibition, Staniszewski 
makes room in the art historical canon for a new type of understanding. In her analysis she does 
not only look at the art on the wall, but considers the importance of how it is placed on the wall. 
Staniszewski’s methods provide an important starting point for understanding the power of the 
specific design decisions that were made in the 1959 exhibition, and her work has inspired mine.  
For a full understanding of the significance of this exhibit as an example of American 
propaganda that exemplifies totalitarian tendencies, an analysis of the exhibit must be placed in 
the context of the avant-garde art movements that so inspired its design. There is little work done 
on this specific comparison. There are many studies of avant-garde art and totalitarianism, or the 
American National Exhibition and modern art that run parallel to each other but never seem to 
collide. I propose it is necessary for this collision to happen—we must understand that the 
American National Exhibition was an event of cultural diplomacy that was just as significant as 
any political diplomacy that occurred during the Cold War because of the specific styles that 
were used. The method I employ is to examine the art historical influences on both the modern 
American art sent abroad with the exhibit as well as the design of the exhibit itself. By 
                                                
21 Emphasis added. Mary Anne Staniszewski, The Power of Display  : A History of Exhibition Installations at the 
Museum of Modern Art (Cambridge, Mass.  : MIT Press, 1998), xxii. 
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interrogating the design language of the exhibition, influences of the avant-garde will be 
revealed.  
Focusing on the design of the exhibition exposes two significant ideas about this event: 
First, that modern art and design aesthetics were often condemned as communist and subversive 
at home in the United States, yet the State Department promoted the distribution of modern art 
abroad. Though they knew that this type of art was controversial in the public eye, State 
Department programs understood that there was some kind of inherent power in modern art and 
design techniques. Second, the design shows that the initial influences for the avant-garde 
aesthetics in the exhibition came from European modernists whose work was often co-opted by 
the totalitarian governments of 1930s Europe. For example, in early 20th century Russia, the 
avant-garde was instated as official cultural policy, meaning that Russian political propaganda in 
the early 20th century was essentially avant-garde. It was at this time that artists such as El 
Lissiztky, who would go on to become incredibly influential on American modern design, 
especially in regard to the exhibition of art, were developing the styles that would come to define 
modernism. It is this contradictory relationship between cutting edge artistic notions and 
government control that drives this story and the questions I ask.  
The study of U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War is by no means an under- 
investigated field. The idea that the United States and the Soviet Union used culture (as did 
governments around the world) as a tool for political propaganda is an established fact. It may 
seem then, that there is little reason to return to this topic again. It is true that a study of U.S. 
cultural diplomacy and power could be focused on any one of the numerous countries that the 
U.S. government identified at risk for turning to communism. These areas are less studied, and 
likely have much to offer to a better understanding of American cultural power abroad. However, 
 18 
in this case, it is important to focus on U.S.-Soviet relations, as this relationship is the most 
dominant historical narrative in our understanding of the Cold War. For this reason, the 
prevailing definition of the actions of the United States during the Cold War must be challenged 
and scrutinized even more closely. 
Chapter 1 discusses the precedents for the American National Exhibition, placing it 
within the context of U.S. cultural diplomacy efforts and other such international exhibitions. 
This chapter attempts to situate the actions surrounding the 1959 exhibition in relation to prior 
cultural diplomacy initiatives, but also to totalitarian regimes that had similarly made use of 
international exhibitions as propaganda forms. The analysis relies on an examination of the 
decision-making process behind the choice of modern art to be included in the American 
National Exhibition, and a discussion of the intense controversy that followed. Here I argue that 
the attitudes surrounding modern art in the United States—in its simultaneous potential as a 
weapon of propaganda, or as some thought, a tool for the promotion of communism—can be 
compared to those held in certain totalitarian dictatorships. This comparison raises questions 
about why these governments appropriated art at all, and why the art of the avant-garde was 
considered particularly effective.  
Delving deeper into the specific design elements employed in these exhibitions, we can 
trace the influence of the avant-garde artists who were often highly involved in creating such 
propaganda events. For example, the propagandist exhibitions were taken up by the United 
States government and the Museum of Modern Art in their collaborative World War II show, 
Road to Victory. This show, designed by Bauhaus-educated Herbert Bayer, made extensive use 
of avant-garde exhibition design technique, and is a touchstone for the tradition of the 
propaganda exhibition in the United States. In examining the networks of design influence 
 19 
leading up to 1959, we can begin to understand the artistic context in which the American 
National Exhibition was conceived. By making these comparisons I hope to set the stage for a 
reconsideration of the meaning of the exhibition. In using the same design techniques that 
powered the propaganda of totalitarian states, the United States, though promoting freedom and 
democracy, relied on a specific power structure created by visual display to spread these 
ideologies in a forceful, yet subtle manner. 
Chapter 2 builds on this idea through a close visual and spatial analysis of the exhibition 
space, in order to illustrate how the architecture and design of the exhibition were meant to 
persuade the viewer. I recreate the space of the art gallery and two of the main exhibition halls 
through a combination of photographs and first person accounts of the space. In recreating these 
spaces, I analyze the exhibition from a new point of view—one that considers the powerful 
design elements at work. These elements were essential to the creation of an event that was, at its 
heart, a magnificent piece of propaganda. This analysis rests on the contention that the design of 
an exhibition is an art form in and of itself, relying on the tools of visual analysis to consider 
elements unique to the experience of an exhibition—elements of time and space, as well as 
visual aesthetic. 
In analyzing the space, I contend that avant-garde aesthetics were not only used because 
they were modern and the U.S. wanted to prove their cultural relevance, but because the avant-
garde style was uniquely suited to the task of persuasion, creating a space where power dynamics 
could be subtly enacted. To make this analysis, I have had to make some choices about 
methodology. My analysis does not rely on reports of how visitors felt at the exhibit, and 
whether or not they personally were persuaded by the display. While the reaction of the visitors 
is no doubt important to understand in a study of the ultimate impact of the exhibition, this is 
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research for another day, and is not within the scope of this project. Instead, I focus my analysis 
on the words of the designers and curators— and the reasons and influences behind the choices 
that were made. This chapter is concerned with how the design was meant to work, or what 
impact its creators felt it could have. It is impossible to know to what extent this propaganda was 
successful. But we can understand how it worked, and what contextual factors motivated the 
design choices that were made for the exhibition. To this end, I take care to avoid putting words 
in the visitors’ mouths, so to speak, and attempt to bolster my argument through explicit 
comparisons that demonstrate established connections between the design of the American 
National Exhibition and earlier avant-garde forms.  
A full comprehension of the motivations, influences and goals—not only political but 
aesthetic ones as well—that lay at the heart of the exhibition’s design is another road to 
understanding that does not rely on the reactions of the viewers as a method of measuring the 
exhibition’s impact, yet still grounds the analysis in something real and specific—a historical 
context. The analysis also relies on the first person accounts of the people designing the 
exhibition, the decisions made by the curator and designer to create a specific and particular 
space. These decisions, and the motivations behind them cannot be disputed. So even though I do 
not attempt to measure the impact of the exhibition through the reactions of the visitors, in 
tracing the influence of the design, and why certain techniques were employed, it is possible to 
better understand what the designers were trying to do. We do not have to know if the design 
was effective, only that it was considered to be so.  This can inform our understanding of the 
exhibit, but also that American actions in the sphere of cultural diplomacy are comparable to 
those of any other regime or government that appropriates culture in the promotion of ideology. 
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Here, I ultimately seek to demonstrate how avant-garde styles can create a space of authority, 
persuasion, and power. 
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Figure 1 
Nixon and Khrushchev during the Kitchen Debate 
The American National Exhibition 
Moscow, 1959 
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Figure 2 
Crowds in the art gallery 
The American National Exhibition 
Moscow, 1959 
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Figure 3 
Crowds outside Buckminster Fuller’s golden geodesic dome. 
The American National Exhibition 
Moscow, 1959 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
View of the glass pavilion from the roof of the dome. 
The American National Exhibition 
Moscow, 1959 
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Figure 5 
Nixon and Khrushchev outside of the glass 
pavilion. The American National Exhibition 
Moscow, 1959 
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Chapter 1 
Before the Exhibition: Influences and Controversies 
 
 
In January 1958, during the heart of the Cold War, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and 
President Dwight. D. Eisenhower signed the U.S-USSR Cultural Exchange Agreement. The 
agreement made provisions for the exchange of cultural exhibitions between the two countries. 
The following year, the Soviet Union exhibited in New York, while the United States presented 
its own exhibition in Moscow at the same time. The exhibition U.S. would be called the 
American National Exhibition in Moscow, and fell within the conventions of U.S. foreign policy 
during the Cold War, which along with military and economic initiatives, also harnessed cultural 
and psychological warfare in the ideological battle against the spread of communism. This 
exchange of culture may seem a brief moment in the long view of the Cold War, but in fact, this 
exhibit was built on a foundation of previous cultural diplomacy and propaganda exhibitions 
initiated by the U.S State Department. Walter Hixon calls the exhibition, “a landmark 
achievement and arguably one of the most successful initiatives in the Cold War.”22 While the 
success of the exhibition may be disputed among scholars, the significance of the exhibition 
within the realm of U.S. international involvement and cultural diplomacy cannot be disputed. 23 
The immense effort that went into creating the exhibition, which became a collaboration between 
public, government agencies such as the United States Information Agency (USIA), and private 
institutions like the Modern Museum of Art (MoMA), as well as independent designers, reflects 
                                                
22 Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1997), xiv. 
23 Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, “Efficacy and Evidence: Evaluating U.S. Goals at the American National Exhibition in 
Moscow, 1959,” Journal of Cold War Studies, no. 4 (2011):138. 
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the far reaching impact of this event. It is clear that the people involved in creating the 
exhibition, from the likes of President Eisenhower to a lowly design assistant, understood the 
power and potential that this particular display of culture could have.  
As important as an exchange of culture was, the exhibit was more than that: it was an 
opportunity for propaganda. Both the Soviet Union and the United States hoped to capitalize on 
this opportunity to “win the hearts and minds” of those who visited the exhibitions.24 The USIA 
proposed that the aim of the American National Exhibition in Moscow was to, “ ‘open the door 
to American life,’ to tell the Russians the truth.” This “impossibly complicated truth was to be 
believable, and convincing display techniques had to be developed.” 25 The exhibition was to 
take place at Sokolniki Park in Moscow, a 1,500 acre space with no existing infrastructure—
perfect for constructing cultural propaganda from the ground up and maximizing the potential of 
the exhibition. Gorky Park, a space in the center of the city, had initially been chosen but the 
buildings proposed to house the exhibition were not structurally sound, so Sokolniki Park was 
decided upon instead.26  
 Plans for the exhibition layout included two large, main buildings. At the entrance to the 
exhibition was the largest aluminum geodesic dome that had ever been built, designed by 
Buckminster Fuller.27 The dome was to be an “information dispensing machine,” covering 
30,000 square feet of exhibition space. Behind the dome lay a glass pavilion, providing an 
                                                
24 The Soviet exhibition took place in New York, at the New York City Coliseum, and ran from June to July, 1959.  
25 “Plastic Parasols, American National Exhibition, Moscow, U.S.S.R,” Architectural Record, Architectural 
engineering, November 1959, 170. 
26 Jack Masey and Conway Lloyd Morgan, Cold War Confrontations: US Exhibitions and Their Role in the 
Cultural Cold War (Lars Müller, 2008): 156. Masey also writes that Harold McClellan, director of American 
National Exhibition, noted that “the Americans did their best not to show how pleased they were with [the] 
proposal” that the exhibition be moved to a place where the exhibition planners would be able to build new 
infrastructure for the fair.  
27 Fuller’s geodesic domes were perhaps his greatest creation, and were commissioned for use in many other similar 
government sponsored fairs and exhibitions, as well as used for military operations, science experiments, and arenas 
for sporting events.  
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additional 50,000 square feet of exhibition space. The pavilion was the heart of the materialistic 
side of the exhibition, and as George Nelson put it, packed with “thousands of diverse objects.”28 
These objects were American consumer goods meant to exemplify the success and prosperity of 
the capitalist American society. The exhibition also included an entire model home, complete 
with a working kitchen where Khrushchev and Nixon engaged in the well-known ‘kitchen 
debate.’ There was a fashion show, a display of American cars, a television studio, as well as 
Edward Steichen’s extremely popular photographic exhibition Family of Man. Perhaps the most 
notable aspect of the larger exhibition however was the display of American painting and 
sculpture.  
Like the rest of the exhibition, the art exhibit acted as a form of propaganda veiled in 
cultural exchange. But unlike the rest of the exhibition, it became an incredibly controversial 
topic in the United States, largely because of the inclusion of works by modern artists who were 
known to have communist leanings. This controversy is key to understanding the political 
motives for including modern art in the exhibit, as well as official government attitudes toward 
these artworks. Only weeks before the artwork in Moscow was to be exhibited, a debate was 
raging in the United States concerning the exhibition of modern art at the American National 
Exhibition. Opponents to the exhibition argued that this new art was not an example of American 
freedom of expression, but rather, the work of communists that only emphasized the seeping of 
the Soviet agenda into American life.  
 The decision-making process behind the selection of works to be shown in Moscow 
demonstrates the desire to apply political goals and motives to specific styles and works of art. 
More significantly, though the planners of the exhibition knew it would be controversial to 
                                                
28 "Plastic parasols, American National Exhibition, Moscow, U.S.S.R.," 170. 
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include modern art, they felt it was necessary and important to do so. 29 The idea was that the 
works chosen for exhibition in Moscow would represent the freedom of expression that the 
USIA so wanted to promote as a mainstay of American life. Franklin C. Watkins, one of the 
jury-members who chose the artworks, contended that the art would “state strongly and frankly 
what has been going on in America since about 1920. We believe it will be charged with vitality 
and the sense of freedom that marks our character.”30  
 A jury of professional artists and art experts was put together to choose the art, with the 
USIA relinquishing full control of this decision to the jury, with the hope that this would assuage 
accusations of excessive government control. The jury consisted of Franklin Watkins, chair of 
the jury, Lloyd Goodrich, director of the Whitney, and artist Henry Hope. The jury was informed 
that, “their decision regarding the content would be final and not subject to review by anyone.”31 
Much of our understanding, then, of the political and ideological philosophies that were placed 
on these pieces of art, must be informed by the jury’s criteria for selection.  
 It was important to the jury that they choose pieces of technical excellence, but also 
pieces that would demonstrate the themes of freedom and equality that were such a vital goal of 
the exhibition. The jury understood the power of the art to speak for them, and that the proper 
combination of artworks would be especially effective in conveying this message. As Watkins 
stated, “This show can have a terrific impact in our favor if we are astute in our selection.” In 
                                                
29 Prior exhibitions of modern American art to be sent abroad had been so contentious that exhibitions were 
cancelled as they tried to get off the ground. In the case of Advancing American Art, a show of 79 contemporary 
paintings organized by the state department in 1947, and meant to be sent abroad on a world tour, there was debate 
surrounding the use of taxpayer’s money on art that many thought had little value or merit. President Truman called 
it “ham-and-eggs art,” and organizations such as the House Un-American Activities Committee deemed it a 
communist conspiracy. Eventually the conflict would cause the exhibit to be cancelled. Clearly the USIA knew what 
it was getting into when the decision was made to include modern art in the 1959 exhibition in Moscow.  
30 quoted in Marilyn S. Kushner, "Exhibiting Art at the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959: Domestic 
Politics and Cultural Diplomacy." Journal Of Cold War Studies 4, no. 1 (2002): 8. 
31 Michael L. Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters for the Human Spirit: American Art and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 157. 
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sending this particular selection of art to Russia, the goal was to “ ‘make their [the Russians’] 
mouths water’ by its expression of freedom and vitality.”32 Ultimately, 49 pieces were chosen to 
be sent abroad, spanning the last 30 years of art in the United States with the logic that the public 
in Moscow would be overwhelmed and “bewildered” by an exhibition consisting solely of 
contemporary art, as they had little chance to be exposed to this form of art. 33 Lloyd Goodrich 
called it “ ‘the broadest, most balanced representation of recent American painting…so far 
shown abroad by our government.’”34  This balance of works included both the representational 
and the abstract, with styles as different as Edward Hopper’s Lighthouse at Two Lights and Mark 
Rothko’s Old Gold over White. Nevertheless, when controversy over the proposed works 
inevitably arose, it was not only the abstract works that came under fire, but also Jack Levine’s 
satirical portrait of an army general, done in a style reminiscent of German Expressionism, and 
clearly critical to the government establishment. 
 A second, equally important goal was also to prove American cultural relevance within the 
art world and present to Moscow and the world an image of the United States as an artistic 
powerhouse, and the new central hub for the greatest innovations in contemporary art. The thorn 
in the jury’s (and the American art world’s) side was the constant allegation coming from Europe 
that America was materialistic, too focused on consumer goods and capitalism to create great 
                                                
32 Ibid  
33 Since the 1930s, the creation of art in the Soviet Union had been highly controlled. Stalin’s regime set the 
precedent for the creation of Socialist Realism, which would become the official style of the communist party. 
Socialist Realism employed a realistic style that glorified the Soviet Union and the worker. As exemplified by Cora 
S. Goldstein’s discussion of Soviet cultural policy in East Germany in the late 1940s, the official Soviet attitude 
towards culture at this time sought to control all intellectual and artistic development and condemned modernism. 
For example, Lieutenant Colonel Alexandar Dymschiz, a Soviet cultural officer declared that, “art must be realistic. 
Surrealism and abstraction have no right to exist. All art that does not fit the specifications is… decadent, 
individualistic, capitalistic…” (page 285 in American Art Policy in Occupied Germany in The Cultural Cold War in 
Western Europe, 1945-60). This attitude did not dissipate even after Stalin’s death. Though the Khrushchev years 
are often characterized as a “thaw,” there was still a tight control over artistic expression, and the official party line 
still did not view modernism in the arts favorably.  
34 Krenn, Fall Out Shelters for the Human Spirit, 158. 
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cultural works.35 Michael Krenn quotes Lloyd Goodrich on this topic, writing that Goodrich 
argued, “ ‘one of the most important governmental art activities today should be the use of 
American art in our cultural relations with other nations.’ It was time he declared, that the world 
knew that American made more than ‘efficient automobiles, airplanes and atom bombs.”36 The 
members of the jury, as well as their fellow leaders in the American art world, were determined 
to change this view, and in the USIA found a willing partner.  
 This collaboration was complicated however, by the inescapable political affiliation that was 
cast on the art exhibit by the mere fact that it was sponsored and supported by the government. 
As Krenn writes, “Members of the art world, such as Goodrich, desired government support for 
an overseas art program but did not want politics to intrude in the selection of art.” Additionally, 
he continues, “the State Department and USIA would only provide support when they believed 
that particular art shown in particular places would have particular propaganda advantages. In the 
years 1958-60, the art world and the U.S. government were compelled to compromise in order to 
sustain the program….” It was then though, that the  “USIA came to the realization that art—
particularly modern art—was not only a popular form of American culture but could also be a 
devastating weapon against the Soviet Union as a symbol of American freedom and diversity.”37  
It is ironic that these very elements of cultural diplomacy, meant to be examples of 
American freedom of expression abroad, were in fact the cause of so much scrutiny and 
controversy at home. For example, Jackson Pollock’s Cathedral was one of the abstract 
expressionist pieces chosen for exhibition. Envisioned by the exhibit organizers to represent 
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freedom of expression and artistic innovation, instead Cathedral’s detractors called the piece a 
“meaningless scribble,” and a “childish doodle” as well as a communist weapon. 38  
To the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), whose job it was to eradicate 
any subversive communistic thought from the American public sphere, Pollock’s Cathedral and 
others were dangerous weapons that, given the chance at exhibition, would only emphasize 
communism’s hold in America. A statement released by the committee contended that, “of the 
69 artists whose works have been chosen for exhibition in Moscow, 34—a fraction less than 50 
percent—have records of affiliation with communist fronts and causes”.39 Wheeler Williams, 
president of the American Artists Professional League, a conservative art organization, was 
instrumental in creating this controversy and involving the House Un-American Activities 
Commission. On July 3rd, 1959, the HUAC held a hearing to investigate the supposed communist 
leanings of the artists slated for exhibition in Moscow. Artists Jack Levine, Ben Shahn, and 
Philip Evergood were subpoenaed to appear before the committee.  
While the HUAC and conservative artists such as Wheeler Williams did not succeed in 
stopping the art from beig sent to Moscow, largely because the government knew it would be 
counterproductive to prohibit the art and be accused of censorship, they did create enough 
commotion to get the press and the president involved. Eisenhower personally did not have a 
high opinion of paintings such as Jack Levine’s Welcome Home, saying that it “looks more like a 
lampoon than art, as far as I am concerned…”40 Nevertheless, he knew that to withdraw the art 
would create accusations of censorship, and play into the hands of Soviet propaganda. As a 
compromise, Eisenhower proposed that 19th century paintings be added to the exhibition of 
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works, but that the controversial works remain.41  
The decision to display the controversial art in Moscow was a successful one. According 
to Lloyd Goodrich, one of the jurors, Levine’s Welcome Home was admired by Russian visitors 
at the exhibition, for “the fact that it was included in spite of official attacks...” which, “was a 
telling demonstration of American freedom of expression."42 
A reliance on the power of art to speak for an ideological purpose is found in Goodrich’s 
endorsement of the art as a demonstration of freedom of expression, as well as the HUAC’s 
condemnation of modern art as communist. During the hearing, Wheeler Williams made sure to 
emphasize the power of this modern “communist” art to topple American values of democracy 
and freedom: 
“They [the communist artists] want to destroy all phases of our culture, and if they can 
destroy our faith in God and our faith in the beauty and wonders of our cultural heritage, 
including the arts and literature and music and so forth, they can take us over without a 
hydrogen bomb. They can take us over with popguns.” 43 
 
Williams’ argument runs parallel to the anti-communist rhetoric that was such a stringent facet of 
U.S. foreign policy during the cold war. This overwhelming fear of the spread of communism is 
on display in Williams’ assertion that art created by artists with communist political leanings 
would effectively destroy American cultural heritage. Williams’ strong statement highlights the 
expectation that cultural objects could also perform politically and therefore had the power to 
completely decimate the core values of a society.  
 More importantly, Williams’ words form the crux of a comparison between the actions of 
the United States and the Soviet Union when it came to using art as a Cold War weapon. Blinded 
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by the never-ending quest for freedom and democracy and the unquestionable equating of 
communism with all things evil, Williams and the HUAC could not acknowledge that their fight 
for the censorship of artistic freedom was exactly what they accused the Soviet Union and the 
communist party of: “the suppression of freedom in art and the debasement of the artist, who is 
turned into a hack and propagandist for the regime in power.”44 Arguably, this unacknowledged 
double-standard did not only exist for the HUAC, but extended in subtle ways to all aspects of 
American action abroad during the Cold War, including cultural diplomacy initiatives. As Emily 
Rosenberg writes, “a fervent anti-Communism justified much illiberal conduct after World War 
II. There could, American liberal-expansionists believed, be no truly enlightened dissent against 
the ultimate acceptance of American ways, and this faith bred an intolerance, a narrowness, that 
was the very opposite of liberality.”45 The American National Exhibition in Moscow is debatably 
an example of this so-called “illiberal conduct.” The appropriation of art in the service of a 
certain ideology does not allow much room for free thinking, even if the ideology being 
promoted is democratic and free. The use of art by governments in an attempt to promote a 
specific ideal is a way to stifle freedom of expression and understanding because it forces a 
certain interpretation on the art and the artist.  
 In defending modern art from accusations of communism, proponents of modern art often 
argued that the display of modern art was synonymous with the inherent freedom and democracy 
of the United States, and therefore could not be communist. Seven years before Wheeler’s 
statements at the 1959 trial, Alfred Barr, director of the Museum of Modern Art in New York, 
had addressed allegations similar to Wheeler’s in his opinion piece “Is Modern Art 
Communistic?” Barr makes important distinctions in this article, describing the attitude towards 
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modern art in the dictatorships of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, where totalitarian 
regimes did not tolerate modern art. He asks, how is it that  Americans consider modern art 
communistic when the communist government of the Soviet Union did not condone this type of 
art and effectively outlawed any freedom of expression in this form? He goes on to write, 
“whatever a Western leader’s point of view on artistic matters may be, he would not want to 
impose his taste upon his countrymen or interfere with their creative freedom” (like Russia and 
Germany did).46  Barr makes it seem unlikely that either of these things could happen in the free, 
Western world of the United States is unheard of. Yet, the events surrounding the 1959 
exhibition do not look so different from the way that the dictators of Germany, Russia, and Italy 
made use of art in service of the propagation of their own totalitarian ideologies. 
 To understand the United States’ use of art as propaganda, before further analyzing the 
type of art or the type of message that was being promoted, it is necessary to consider the 
example of how various dictatorships of Europe, from the 1930s to the Cold War, harnessed the 
power of the visual for their own political gain. These governments were also acutely aware of 
how art and radical artistic movements might subvert their regimes. This is clearly not a 
phenomenon that is unique to this time or place—nations and groups have been using visual 
propaganda since the beginning of time, and the practice is by no means dead today. I make this 
specific comparison to totalitarian regimes in Europe because of the unique relationship between 
the formation of modern American art and the classical avant-garde style that originated in 
Europe. The creation of many American modern movements owe their inspiration to the 
multitude of European artists who sought refuge in the United States during and after World War 
II, fleeing from persecution and bringing with them the traditions and ideals of the avant-garde. 
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It was out of this migration that movements like Abstract Expressionism, considered essentially 
American, were born.  
The European avant-garde came into existence at the beginning of the twentieth century 
to challenge the conventional, the mainstream, the bourgeois. These artists invented radically 
new ways of seeing, changing the course of the visual language of Western art forever.  The 
various movements and “isms” that sprung up across Europe during this time not only 
encompassed a style of art, but also a way of being. Each group had its own manifesto, its own 
unique take on how art and life should operate in this new age of modernity, industrialization, 
and world wars. F.T Marinetti and the Italian futurists radically proclaimed that the machine was 
the way of the future, museums should be demolished, war was “the only hygiene of the world,” 
and that a “a roaring car that seems to be driving under shrapnel, is more beautiful than the 
Victory of Samothrace.”47 The Dadaists rejected all convention and produced art in opposition of 
authoritarianism and nationalism. The Surrealists challenged reality, and in Russia, Malevich and 
the Suprematists harnessed geometry to redefine perception, while the Constructivists employed 
materials and design to express a new experience of modern life.  
Because these avant-garde groups defined themselves through radical manifestos and 
challenging tradition, it was these artists and movements that came under fire during the regimes 
of Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin. To examine just one example, Hitler proclaimed modern, avant-
garde art “degenerate,” created by mentally unstable people. This art was “un-German,” the work 
of Jews and Communists. It was diametrically opposed to the classical art that Hitler favored to 
promote his ideology of the superior German Aryan race. In 1937, the Nazi party devoted an 
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entire exhibition to this “degenerate art,” which had been forcibly taken out of national museums 
and hung haphazardly on the wall of a cramped gallery in Munich to make a statement about its 
worthlessness. If we pause for a moment and compare Hitler’s attitude and actions to the words 
and concerns that Wheeler Williams voiced in the HUAC hearings regarding the modern art to 
be sent abroad to Moscow, the tone is eerily similar. In the rhetoric of the HUAC, modern art 
was “Un-American” and communist, not worthy of being included in a serious conversation 
about artistic merit. This call for nationalism and patriotism through the defamation of modern 
art was not so far from the methods of propaganda employed by totalitarian governments.48 If 
this is true, a redefinition of America’s spread of democracy through “freedom of expression” 
and cultural diplomacy must be considered.  
Though the HUAC and the United States Information Agency were idealistically opposed 
with regard to taste in art, their respective attitudes toward modern art—one as “Un-American” 
and the other as the epitome of American freedom of expression—were located in the same 
tradition of an appropriation of art in order to make an ideological point. Additionally, though 
these two organizations had different ideas about how to do this, they were both concerned with 
controlling art to promote the spread of American democracy against the dangers of communistic 
thought. The aesthetics of American modern art and artistic style that the HUAC and the USIA 
were concerned with had direct roots in the European avant-garde. This comparison reveals the 
power that the aesthetics of the avant-garde had to make a statement, even when that statement 
was twisted by a government in the service of its own agenda.  
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Sending American art abroad and creating exhibitions abroad was by no means a new 
phenomenon. The cultural division of the US State Department was active at home and abroad 
both during World War II and in the aftermath of the war. They were involved with arranging 
exhibitions of American art and goods at home and abroad as part of trade shows, art fairs, and 
the Marshall Plan, all attempts at cultural diplomacy and the American government’s mission to 
fight communism with culture. In a June 1941 article, museums and exhibitions were called, “the 
latest and strangest recruit in Uncle Sam’s defense line-up…” In the same article, John Hay 
Whitney, the president of the board of MoMA, deemed the museum “a weapon in national 
defense.”49 By the time the American National Exhibition of 1959 was conceived, the medium of 
the exhibition had long been accepted as a powerful tool of persuasion.  
 Beyond examining the art and objects of the American National Exhibition of 1959, the 
exhibit itself as a propaganda medium provides a unique and rich landscape for analysis. 
Exhibitions are relatively small, controlled environments, and as a result are well suited to the 
task of persuasion. Herbert Bayer, a designer whose work would inspire the design of the 
American National Exhibition, believed that exhibition design was, “the apex of all collective 
efforts, of all powers of design.”50 Each element of an exhibition can be planned to create a total 
environment as envisioned by its maker. The path visitors take through the gallery, the pieces 
shown, the informational wall text, the lighting, wall color—these things are premeditated to 
create a certain effect. The exhibit hall is an enclosed space, a performance space, separate from 
outside society and ruled by certain laws of etiquette. By nature, the medium of an exhibit, with 
its origin in the museum, holds an innate and indisputable authority.   
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 Road to Victory, a highly political exhibition put on by the Museum of Modern Art and 
sponsored by the U.S. government during World War II, was an important predecessor of the 
American National Exhibition in Moscow. Road to Victory: A Procession of Photographs of the 
Nation at War opened in 1944 and was meant to celebrate the power and resilience of the United 
States during a time of war. It is also a revealing instance of how exhibition design can be used 
to create a propaganda message. The exhibition, directed by photographer Edward Steichen of 
Family of Man fame, with text written by poet Carl Sandburg, was a vividly staged 
demonstration of nationalism.51 Herbert Bayer, a successful designer and architect who had 
recently emigrated from Germany to the United States, designed the exhibit. Bayer had also been 
a student and teacher at the famed German Bauhaus school, and his philosophies and design 
choices reflect his early education at the school. Road to Victory, a homage to modern exhibition 
design techniques, consisted of larger than life photography, bolstered by Sandburg’s text, and 
brought together by Bayer’s design. In a MoMA press release from 1944, the exhibit is described 
as “a dramatic presentation of this country’s mighty resources and the power of its people in their 
struggle toward victory.”52 This dramatic exhibition was an overt work of propaganda. The 
Museum of Modern Art made no attempt to disguise the purpose of the exhibition, calling it, 
“one of the most powerful propaganda efforts yet attempted.”53 The artists involved—a 
photographer, poet, and designer— were the reason that the exhibition was so powerful, as well 
as popular.  
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Upon opening, Road to Victory received a highly positive public response and was 
extremely well attended. What was it that made the exhibition so popular and successful? The 
answer lies in the design of the exhibition. The exhibition’s design and layout did not leave the 
interpretation of propaganda to chance. Herbert Bayer’s installation design of Road to Victory 
was quite literally a “procession of photographs,” built to direct the visitor on a precise and 
deliberate path through the exhibition. Monroe Wheeler, the Director of Exhibitions and 
Publications for MoMA, described the exhibit as a tool that provided “every American,” a 
chance “to see himself as a vital and indispensable element of victory.”54 On Bayer’s Road to 
Victory each museum visitor was a well-calculated element. The exhibition was made up of large 
photographs that depicted iconic American scenes. Visitors entering the exhibition were first 
confronted by giant images displaying scenes of the American west: forests, buffalo, portraits of 
Native Americans, and Zion National Park. Sandburg’s accompanying text, invoking a biblical 
tone, proclaimed, “In the beginning was virgin land and America was promises—and the Red 
man gave over to an endless tide of white men in endless numbers with a land hunger and no end 
to the land they wanted….”55 The exhibition continued in this vein, as visitors marched on a 
designated path through oversized photographs of American land, farmers, industry, and 
wholesome small-towns, all the while reading Sandburg’s text tinged with the ideas of Manifest 
Destiny and American exceptionalism. 
At the American Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, the propaganda could not be so explicit. 
Prior to the planning of the US-USSR cultural exchange exhibitions, both sides engaged in 
negotiations that were fraught with disagreement and conditions, with the Soviets often shutting 
down the exhibition plans proposed by U.S. representatives. The Soviet Union negotiators 
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demanded that whatever was shown in the exhibit be “cultural and non-political in character.”56 
Nevertheless, banning overt political messages only allowed the cultural aspects of the 
exhibition, as well as the over-all design, to become parts of the implicit and subtle (sometimes 
not-so) propaganda that was the ultimate goal of the exhibition. American ambassador to the 
USSR, Llewellyn Thompson declared that, “nothing we have done will have the impact on 
Soviet developments that this exhibition will have if we do it right.”57  
What did “doing it right” entail? Planning for the exhibition began in September 1958 
when the USIA Director and general manager of the exhibition, George Allen, appointed Jack 
Masey as Chief of Design and Construction of the American National Exhibition. Masey 
recruited other well-known modern designers and architects such as Buckminster Fuller, George 
Nelson, Richard Barringer, and Charles and Ray Eames to help design the buildings and the 
interior of the exhibitions. These designers were contracted by the United States government to 
imbue the exhibition in Moscow with the most modern design techniques, and in doing so, were 
acting in a similar role as Herbert Bayer in Road to Victory and his contemporaries in Europe. 
Bayer was a key transmitter of European design methods to the United States. Chanzit argues in 
her analysis of Bayer’s career that Bayer’s move to the United States, “meant that new avant-
garde design methods would be introduced firsthand and assimilated to create a more 
sophisticated fabric of American design, beginning a new era in American design.”58 The 
designers of the American National Exhibition in 1959 were at the forefront of this new era. 
George Nelson, as one of the lead designers of the American National Exhibition, 
profoundly influenced the design choices made at the exhibition. Nelson had spent time in Rome 
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as a student, and while abroad, had met and interviewed influential modern architects such as 
Mies van der Rohe and Le Corbusier.59 Nelson, whose work was undoubtedly influenced by his 
time in Europe, also drew direct influence from Herbert Bayer. In Display, Nelson’s 1953 book 
on exhibition design, he devotes twelve pages to a discussion of Bayer’s work, claiming that 
Bayer, “more than any other designer, has developed, synthesized and expounded new ways of 
visual communication, and in his work in the field of exhibition design he has brought together a 
remarkable variety of techniques and media.” Nelson also refers to the Bauhaus school, where 
Bayer and his contemporaries worked and studied, as “that extraordinary institution whose 
influence is still felt in both design and art education.” 60 It is clear from both Nelson’s words and 
work that he has been influenced by the Bauhaus group, who in turn were guided by the earlier 
work of avant-garde artists in the development of Bauhaus practices and ideologies.  
In this period of art and design the threads of influence are multi-layered and dense. It is 
impossible to understand one artist, one school, one piece, one exhibit, without making reference 
to all the others that came before or were happening at the same time. Therefore, we cannot 
engage in a discussion of design at the 1959 American National Exhibition without first 
considering what came before. It is important to note that these exhibition techniques were 
considered revolutionary—never before had the exhibition space transcended the staid display of 
works on the flat walls of a room.61 Understanding the influences and motives behind the 
American National Exhibition not only make clear that the design philosophies employed in 
creating the 1959 exhibition were first and foremost rooted in the avant-garde realm of 
experimental exhibition design, but also reveal the complicated relationship between design and 
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politics. The American National Exhibition, with its design so deeply grounded in the avant-
garde was remarkably similar to the propaganda exhibitions put on by Nazi Germany and fascist 
Italy and should be studied within this context. 
Delving deeper into the history and design process of Road to Victory also highlights 
strong parallels between this exhibition and ones created by the dictatorships of 1920s and 1930s 
Europe. As exemplified by this show, in the realm of state-sponsored propaganda, avant-garde 
aesthetics were integral to the success of such exhibitions. This style of exhibition—one that 
relied largely on the display of photos and murals—was relatively new to American audiences. 
Scholar Kristie La argues that Road to Victory “…occupies a pivotal place in the international 
history of monumental photo-exhibition design: Road to Victory was the American debut of this 
radical aesthetic practice, first developed by the Soviets and then employed by the Italian 
Fascists and German National Socialists.”62 In the design of Road to Victory Herbert Bayer 
brought with him the influences of international exhibition design, a field dominated by well-
known avant-garde artists. Not only did Bayer bring these influences to American audiences, but 
he was able to make popular this style of “radical aesthetic practice” and dramatically enhance 
this particular manner of propaganda exhibition in the United States. 
The enormous photomontage that concluded Road to Victory was markedly similar to 
those found in propaganda exhibitions of European totalitarian states in the 1920s and 1930s. In 
this instance in Bayer’s design, the influence of the avant-garde is especially apparent. Bayer’s 
method of exhibition design was noticeably influenced by El Lissitzky’s work on the Soviet 
Pavillion at the International Press Exhibition (Pressa) in 1928 in Cologne, Germany.63 Lissitzky, 
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a member of the Russian constructivist group, with connections to the Bauhaus, was well known 
for pushing the envelope in the field of exhibition design, and Pressa was no different. In fact, it 
changed the direction of exhibition design entirely; Bayer called Lissitzky’s work at Pressa a 
“revolutionary turning point”.64 Lissitzky’s Soviet pavilion, meant to promote the ideologies of 
the Soviet Union, harnessed many avant-garde techniques, the most striking of which was an 
immense photomural made up of Russian press photographs. The mural, a typical example of the 
avant-garde style of photomontage, was paired with text that stated, “the education of the masses 
is the main task of the Pressa in the transitional period from capitalism to communism.”65 While 
it was a landmark event for avant-garde exhibition design, it is clear from the images and text 
presented at the exhibit that the ultimate goal of Pressa, like Road to Victory, was a political one. 
It was successful propaganda powered by the aesthetics of the avant-garde, and it was not unique 
during this time. The technique of photomontage in the form of large photographic murals, 
would begin to crop up in a number of subsequent political propaganda exhibitions in Europe, 
particularly in countries with a totalitarian regime.  
 Lissitzky’s influence is evident in the political propaganda exhibitions of Germany and 
Italy in the 1930s. As Benjamin Buchloh puts it, Pressa was a model that “could provide a highly 
productive and dynamic fusion of textual and visual devices for the propaganda of the newly 
established totalitarian state apparatuses,” and these states, by embracing the success of Pressa, 
embraced the aesthetics of the avant-garde.66   
In Italy, the propaganda exhibition La Mostra Della Rivoluzione Fascista (The Exhibition 
of the Fascist Revolution) opened in 1932 to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Fascist 
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takeover and reaffirm the power of Mussolini and the fascist government. La Mostra made 
extensive use of avant-garde styles, notably futurism and constructivism. The exhibit was the 
work of a cadre of modern artists and architects such as Enrico Prampolini, Mario Sironi, and 
Giuseppe Terragni. These artists, like Bayer, were also influenced by Lissitzky’s pavilion at 
Pressa.67 Many rooms in the exhibition employed gigantic, bold photomontage and collage, 
which glorified the fascist state and towered over the visitors. Bayer’s Road to Victory 
photomural is reminiscent of Giuseppe Terragni’s photomontage in the Room of 1922 at La 
Mostra. Terrangni’s collage depicted photographs of crowds of people—“the masses”—cut, 
shaped and arranged so that the collage overwhelmed the walls of the room and projected three-
dimensionally into the space, creating a visual assault on the visitor. F.T Marinetti, founder of 
Futurism, called the exhibition, “a triumph of futurist style,” and praised the “new aesthetic of 
the machine and speed, typically Italian and fascist,” which was on display in the design of La 
Mostra della Rivoluzione. As Emily Braun writes, in this exhibit, “By patronizing and 
commissioning the ‘new volumes’ and ‘vanguard communication structures’ of futurism and 
constructivism, the regime adapted them to exalt ‘predetermined propaganda messages.’”68 
Though the “communication structures” and styles of the avant-garde movements remained 
intact in La Mostra, these aesthetics, once appropriated for governmental propaganda, were no 
longer tied to the original context of the avant-garde.  
In a similar vein, in Germany, Hitler’s government put on a series of political exhibitions 
from the years 1934-1937.69 These shows were tools with which a powerful regime could 
persuade its public. Intense nationalism and Nazi ideologies about racial purity were strongly 
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promoted through each exhibition. These exhibitions however, mark the brief period before 
official party rhetoric would embrace neo-classicism and term modern art “degenerate.” Instead, 
the Nazi exhibit-planning committee turned to a modern group of designers and artists – 
including Herbert Bayer and his Bauhaus colleagues—to be the architects of these ideologically 
charged exhibitions.70 For example, the exhibition Deutschland, created for the 1936 Olympics, 
displayed an enormous photomontage of Hitler surrounded by loyal crowds and followers, 
strikingly reminiscent of Terragni’s work in La Mostra Della Rivoluzione Fascista.71 Bayer, 
while not always directly involved in the exhibition design of these exhibits, created many of the 
promotional materials for the exhibits, which were dripping with party rhetoric and made 
extensive use of photomontage depicting mass rallies of National Socialism.  
It is clear that with the help of Herbert Bayer’s influence, Road to Victory applied many 
of the same methods of experimental, avant-garde design found in propaganda exhibitions of the 
Soviet Union, fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The American National Exhibition in 1959, with 
designers like George Nelson who were so strongly influenced by Bayer and his circle, was not 
at all a departure from this method. The exhibition’s design, as well as the deliberate depiction of 
modern art by the USIA, offers a window into understanding American cultural diplomacy 
initiatives in a larger sense, outside of the typical narrative of the spread of freedom and 
democracy. The choices that the USIA and government officials made to include modern art and 
design as key components of the exhibition, and the controversy that ensued because of these 
decisions, make clear the strength of visual propaganda to all types of government, whether they 
are democratic or totalitarian. 
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Figure 6 
Jackson Pollock’s Cathedral, (1947). 
Enamel and aluminum paint on canvas 
Displayed in the art exhibition of The American National Exhibition Moscow, 
1959 
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Figure 6 
Jack Levine 
Welcome Home,1946.  
Oil on canvas 
Displayed in the art exhibition of The American National Exhibition 
Moscow, 1959 
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Figure 7 
Entrance to Road to Victory 
The Museum of Modern Art 
New York, 1942 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
Herbert Bayer’s model for Road to Victory 
The Museum of Modern Art 
New York, 1942 
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Figure 10 
Concluding photomontage of Road to Victory 
The Museum of Modern Art 
New York, 1942 
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Figure 11 
Close up of El Lissitzky’s photomural. 
Soviet Pavilion at Pressa 
1928 
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Figure 12 
Giuseppe Terragni’s Room of 
1922. La Mostra della 
Rivoluzione Fascista Rome, 
1932 
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Figure 13 
Herbert Bayer, photomontage in 
Deutschland catalogue. Berlin, 1936 
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Chapter 2 
Reading the Exhibition  
 
“…just as there are ‘sermons in stones and books and in running brooks,’ 
 to take Shakespeare’s view, there are indeed messages being transmitted  
by inanimate objects which can be ‘read’ by anyone 
capable of seeing what he is looking at.” 72 
 
“There is plenty of propaganda without art, but at least mighty 
 little worthy art without propaganda—for propaganda is 
 the raison d’etre of the greatest arts….People are better 
 persuaded when they don’t realize that they are being persuaded.  
They resent the unconcealed and bald implication that they need to be persuaded.”73  
 
 
 Upon entering the glass pavilion in Sokolniki Park in the summer of 1959, visitors to the 
exhibition found themselves in George Nelson’s “Jungle Gym.” Aptly named for its resemblance 
to a child’s playground, this system of display was a flexible set-up of of steel bars and multi-
colored panels, upon which hundreds of American cultural products were displayed. In the 
Jungle Gym, the visitor to the exhibition was immediately engulfed in a barrage of sights and 
sounds. One newspaper writer described the space as a “riot of color” that visitors could 
“clamber through” to see the “products of basically every consumer industry.”74 In addition to 
housing the painting and sculpture, the structure was divided into various exhibits that covered 
“items in the cultural, industrial, home, and leisure-time groups,” such as a working television 
studio and a “miracle” kitchen where baking demonstrations took place.75 There were also 
displays of books, textiles, music, radios, furniture, children’s toys, and much more. In 
comparison to the correlating exhibition space found in the dome and known as the “idea 
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building,” the glass pavilion was deemed the “Item building” because of the number of objects 
displayed there.  The idea was that “The display of these thousands of items related to daily 
living in the United States,” would, “reflect the immense variety and the great freedom of 
economic system” and the importance of American consumerism.76  
 When New Republic journalist Frank Getlein reviewed the American National Exhibition 
in 1959, he focused his account on what the exhibition looked like, including a detailed 
description of the spatial layout of the show. He interviewed his Russian friend and fellow writer 
Victor Gorokhov about his impressions of the show, and concluded that, “it was the style, not the 
styles, that got him.” Gorokhov was struck by Buckminster Fuller’s geodesic dome as well as the 
display inside: “the main show within the dome also impressed Gorokhov ‘as a form, mind you, 
as a form.’”77 This chapter is also concerned with the form of the exhibition, and discusses the 
avant-garde influence that was present in the design of the American National Exhibition. As 
designer George Nelson writes, the space can be “read” and understood in an examination of the 
inanimate aspects of the exhibition display. These spaces of display were very much meant to 
transmit a certain message to the viewer. Through a close analysis of the architectural and spatial 
elements of the art gallery, Nelson’s Jungle Gym structure, and the short film Glimpses of the 
USA, this chapter explores the way that power, authority, and meaning is conveyed through the 
deliberate design of space. In particular, this chapter looks to consider why the philosophies of 
the avant-garde and traditions of contemporary display lent themselves so well to the propaganda 
effort of the exhibition.  
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 Idealistic, universal, and utopian ideals often drove the actions of avant-garde designers and 
artists. The self-defined universality of avant-garde art made it especially suitable as an 
ideological tool that could promote the ideas of individuality and freedom. It is possible to trace 
specific visual strategies that were used at the 1959 exhibition, yet have roots in the avant-garde. 
For example, in examining modern display techniques for art, we must consider the “white cube” 
installation style that was employed in the art gallery. In an analysis of the larger exhibition 
space, focused here on George Nelson’s “Jungle Gym” structure, there are two specific 
techniques to be interrogated further: the scaffold-like, cage-like strategy of display, and the 
experience of bombardment of images, which is continued in the film Glimpses of the USA. All 
of these techniques exert a specific experience upon the viewer, and play a role in creating a 
dynamic of power within the exhibition space.  
 
The Art Gallery  
 One example of this dynamic of power existed within the art gallery. When Edith Halpert, 
the curator of the art show, arrived in Moscow prior to the exhibit in the summer of 1959, she 
found the exhibition site a chaotic and disorganized mess. With just weeks to go until opening, 
the builders and designers were massively behind schedule and plagued by technical problems. 
Those involved in the construction and design of the site found it impossible to envision how this 
“madhouse” as Halpert remembered it, would transform into the powerful cultural spectacle that 
it was destined to become in just a few days.78 For her part, Halpert got to work renovating the 
section of the exhibition hall that was designated for the display of the painting and sculpture. A 
seasoned art dealer and curator, Halpert could see that the space given to her was inadequate for 
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her purposes. Upon seeing the space, she was “utterly shocked,” by the size, “it was so small, 
and I kept thinking of forty-eight pictures and so many pieces of sculpture—where the hell 
would you put them?”79 Somehow though, even among the chaos, Halpert was able to make it 
work. She painted the walls and ceilings white, and changed the lighting so that it was better 
suited to viewing art. When asked if there was any objection to her changes, she responded, “I 
could have put on a strip tease troop there, and they [the U.S government officials in charge of 
the exhibition] wouldn’t have known the difference….”80 In the days prior to the exhibition, the 
designers and officials were frantically trying to finish everything before the opening. 
Nevertheless, the exhibit would open successfully, and, in the words of a LIFE magazine 
headline, “Good Displays” would “Catch Crowds.” The good displays did indeed catch crowds. 
The exhibition was extremely well attended, attracting 3 million visitors during its 6 week run.81  
 The controversy that had surrounded the artworks when they were initially chosen did not 
dissipate in Moscow. Though the art gallery was passed over by Nixon and Khrushchev in their 
initial tour of the exhibition because the art was “too controversial,” the exhibition of painting 
and sculpture would prove to be one of the most well attended and most talked about areas of the 
Jungle Gym.82 According to Halpert, “several days after the exhibition opened against all odds,” 
a Russian art critic reported that, “ ‘The art section is by far the most vivacious arousing so much 
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commotion that it drowns out even the voices coming from the nearby TV demonstration.’”83   
The Russian public was by no means un-informed about the dispute surrounding the 
selection of art for the show. In fact, they were as eager to see the controversial art as they were 
to see the notorious curator of the exhibition. During the HUAC controversy Edith Halpert had 
stridently upheld the choice of Welcome Home for the exhibition after Eisenhower called the 
work a “lampoon.” She had retorted that, “Some people think the President’s paintings aren’t so 
good either,”84 taking a stab at Eisenhower’s amateur painting hobby. Consequently, one news 
story from the exhibition reported that, "countless visitors to the exhibition have asked, 'What 
happened to the woman who dared to criticize your President's judgment?" When Mrs. Halpert is 
pointed out to them, they stare in disbelief and demand to see the name on her passport."85 This 
extreme interest in both the art and the curator only increased the discussion and scrutiny 
surrounding the art exhibition.  
 Visitor responses to the art varied, sometimes positive, sometimes disgusted, but responses 
were rarely neutral. For example, one visitor called the abstract art “incomprehensible,” while 
another was “disgusted to the bottom of my heart” with the art exhibit. Still another stated, “the 
abstract art insults the best sentiments of simple men.”86 And when Khrushchev finally did visit 
the art gallery, he “found it repugnant.”87 Edith Halpert however, reported that she wished she 
could have “recorded the enthusiastic remarks each day, the extraordinary effect the show had on 
a large number of artists, architects, writers, designers, and museum personnel…as well as many 
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layman visitors throughout the day.”88 Though these comments provide insight into individual 
feelings toward the exhibit, they cannot be wholly relied upon as a method of analyzing the 
exhibition space, as they only relate the experiences of those who felt strongly about the 
exhibition, and had the motivation and opportunity to write their thoughts down.  
 Official American and Soviet accounts are also incredibly biased—for obvious reasons. 
American news sources related the triumph and success of the exhibition, while Soviet sources 
took up the official, negative, view of modern art.89 Many of the Soviet reports found fault with 
the abstract style, ironically not unlike American detractors of modern art. For example, one 
reporter wrote, “the profoundly reactionary quintessence of abstraction and its corrupt influence 
lie in the fact that it separates the artist from the spectator or from the nation, that it destroys the 
simple elements of literal reality in art which make the work intelligible and understandable.”90 
Another wrote that, “the majority of pictures are of the abstract genre that is fashionable in the 
West, and they evoke annoyance and perplexity among the spectators.”91  
 The location and plan of the physical space of the art exhibit influenced the way visitors 
experienced the art. The gallery was located in one corner of the Jungle Gym, on the second 
floor of the structure, somewhat isolated from the rest of the exhibitions by both its physical 
situation and style of display. The paintings were arranged chronologically on white walls, 
differing from the more haphazard display employed by the other exhibits in the Jungle Gym. 
The area allotted for the art exhibit was a long rectangular space flanked by two entrances—this 
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created something of a funnel effect when crowds of people entered the gallery. As Edith Halpert 
describes it,  
“Situated as the art section was—on the second floor, between two stairways—not only did 
those interested in art crowd into the alcoves, but a large captive audience was forced by the 
mobs through the two wide entrances. Although the exhibition was arranged 
chronologically, more or less, the visitors were rapidly propelled past the realistic examples 
to face a wall displaying Grant Wood, Pollock, O’Keeffe, Blume, Hartley, Kuniyoshi and 
Albright. They gasped, laughed and exclaimed, surrounding the guides and me in enormous, 
hot circles”92 
 
Though the exhibition had been selected with the goal of presenting a balanced depiction of 
American art over the past thirty years, and arranged chronologically to show a progression, the 
physical space of the gallery created a different focus.93 Funneled through the space in the way 
Halpert describes, visitors were suddenly confronted with works that were recent, modern, and 
provoking, and somewhat shocking to Soviet audiences whose only exposure to art in recent 
years was the state sanctioned Social Realism. Due to the extremely high number of visitors in 
the gallery, people were quite literally pushed up against the art—later guard rails would be 
installed to protect the canvases. The wall that Halpert describes was one of the largest and most 
prominent in the exhibition and uniquely situated so that it could easily be seen as one entered 
the exhibition. The New York Times reported that, “The excitement waxes around the modern 
works. Loud guffaws and jeering gestures are hurled at paintings of Jackson Pollock and Ben 
Shahn. But many visitors study these paintings carefully…”94 It was this sudden confrontation 
that characterized the gallery experience, and emphasized these provoking modern pieces. 
Additionally, the controversy surrounding the art was by no means a secret, and visitors came 
eager to see these paintings that had caused such a stir.  
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Figure A.  
Diagram of gallery space.95  
 
                                                
95 This diagram represents a partial layout of the exhibition, gleaned from multiple photographs 
and original plans of the exhibition from the National Archives (Design Drawings for the 
American National Exhibition in Moscow, 1957 – 1959). There is a lack of range of photos from 
the exhibition, and for this project was impossible to recreate a full image of where each painting 
was located. However, this diagram does show the bottleneck effect that occurred in the gallery, 
as visitors were pushed towards the back wall, where they were confronted with a long wall of 
modern art.  
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The arrangement of art on the gallery wall provides insight into the physical layout of the 
exhibition space, but also the spatial experience of the exhibition. Compared to the rest of the 
Jungle Gym, the art gallery seemed conservative in its form and plan—a simple line of paintings 
on white walls. This format has become commonplace in the display of art and at first glance 
seems unremarkable. In Mary Anne Staniszewski’s discussion of the history of exhibition 
display at MoMA, she makes an excellent argument for why this form of display is significant. 
At the time of the 1959 exhibition, the practice of displaying works of art in a single line on 
white or neutral colored walls had only become commonplace in the last 30 years. This 
emergence of the “white cube,” has its origins in Alfred Barr’s Museum of Modern Art during 
the 1930s. In his exhibitions, Barr eschewed the then typical gallery tradition of ‘skying’ 
paintings above eye-level in clumped groups on the gallery wall—a well established museum 
installation technique with its origins in the royal museums and national galleries of the 19th 
century—and instead organized the work in a single, well-spaced line. When Edith Halpert 
installed the paintings at the American National Exhibition in a similar way, she was likely only 
acting according to the norms of the day. However, though this format of display was standard 
for the time and the “white cube” has become unquestioned today, deeper meanings must be 
considered. As Staniszweski argues, this seemingly neutral method of display is anything but, in 
fact: “it produces a powerful and continually repeated social experience that enhances the 
viewer’s sense of autonomy and independence.”96  
                                                
96 Staniszewski, The Power of Display, 66. 
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The progression of works of art widely spaced in a line on a white background allows for 
a specific viewing experience. The visitor to the exhibition is not only confronted with the 
overall experience of the art gallery, but is given the opportunity to individually view each piece. 
This display enables a one-on-one interaction between the artwork and the visitor, “The 
placement of paintings on neutral-colored walls at just below eye level and at relatively widely 
spaced intervals created a ‘field of vision’ that facilitated appreciation of a singular artwork.”97 
Although the climate of the gallery at the American National Exhibition was not the quiet, 
contemplative atmosphere of the average art museum, this idea of “appreciation” of a single 
artwork is not lost. In the context of the American National Exhibition, this relationship between 
art and viewer must be understood in the framework of the cultural diplomacy effort that the 
exhibition represented.  
The ultimate goal of the exhibition was to portray American freedom and democracy. 
The art exhibition accomplished this by not only exhibiting modern art, but by exhibiting it in 
this “white cube,” promoting the importance of individually viewing art. Staniszewski argues 
that this was an installation practice that would, “magnify the viewer’s sense of autonomy and 
individual experience, characteristics particularly significant for the modern sense of self in a 
liberal democracy.” The result of this experience was the creation of an “ideological apparatus,” 
in which, “the liberal democratic ideal of the autonomous, independent individual born to natural 
rights and free will is the foundation of the mythology of the American dream.”98 By this 
analysis, the implementation of the white cube within the Jungle Gym was in a subtle way, a 
continuation of the overall goal of the exhibition: a promotion of democracy, individuality, and 
freedom. 
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The white cube display was an excellent choice for an exhibition meant to persuade. The 
white cube not only emphasized the individuality of viewing a work of art, but was (and is) well 
suited to the promotion of a certain message. In the white cube, there is a certain amount of 
decontextualization that occurs—works are situated on a neutral ground, divorced from their 
original context and origin. It is the curator’s role to arrange these works in the gallery, and to 
provide information about the art. The way in which they do this creates a particular narrative. 
There is a power dynamic that exists in curating, an inherent measure of authority that comes 
about in the ordering and interpretation of art. In an exhibition such as the one in Moscow, which 
existed in such a politically charged context, with the art being used as propaganda in service of 
the state, this is especially true. Halpert did not arrange the art with the explicit intent of making 
a propaganda statement, however, the success of the white cube exhibition strategy is partially 
dependent on a decontextualization of the work. As Emma Barker argues, this strategy creates a 
sense of “effacement and simultaneous self-negation: highlighting the inherent (that is formal) 
qualities of a work of art through the neutralization of its original context and content….”99 This 
seemingly neutral format of display emphasized the work of art itself, rather than the context. In 
an understanding of how the layout of the artwork reinforced certain political goals at the 
American National Exhibition, this idea of decontextualization is essential (and related to the 
eagerness to use abstract art to promote the ideology of freedom and democracy). Though the art 
was given context in the chronological organization of the gallery, use of explanatory text, and 
tours given by Halpert and guides, the combination of the power of the white cube to wipe 
original context, and the intensely political and propaganda atmosphere in which the art 
                                                
99 Emma Barker, Contemporary Cultures of Display (Yale University Press, 1999), 31. 
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exhibition existed made it so that the artwork could not be separated from the promotion of 
American ideology.   
 
 
The Jungle Gym and Glimpses of the USA  
 The structure of the Jungle Gym was particularly suited to this job of depicting a multitude 
of objects of various sizes and styles. True to its name, the Jungle Gym was reminiscent of a 
children’s playground, an open structure made up of steel and aluminum bars that formed two 
stories of a connected cage-like display system which existed within the glass pavilion as an 
interior organizing structure for the exhibits. The official guidebook written for the exhibition 
guides emphasized the flexibility of the structure both in terms of set up and space, “the 
specifically designed exhibit structure allows for easy assembly, traffic pattern control, and 
adjustability to the variety of shapes and sizes of the products on display.” The exhibits were 
stacked on top of each other in “cubes shaped to fit the various-sized products, descriptive texts, 
and photographs” and delineated by hanging vertical panels and ceiling panels that segmented 
the space. 100 As described by a reporter from LIFE magazine, “Airy panels of transparent color, 
set in bold geometric patterns,” separated “exhibits of dishes and cooking utensils. Visitors saw 
this spectacle from balconies.”101 People visiting the exhibition could travel between the displays 
using stairs that connected the two floors of the Jungle Gym, and elevated walkways running 
through and above the entire structure.  
 To fully envision the atmosphere of the space, we must imagine beyond the still black and 
white photographs. The hanging panels that divided the exhibits were made from colorful 
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translucent plastic of blue, green, orange and magenta—as Edith Halpert put it, the “ceilings 
were painted a la Mondrian.”102 These panels were illuminated and enhanced by spotlights as 
well as the natural light coming through the windowed front and rear walls of the glass pavilion, 
making the space bright and vibrant. In the summer of 1959, the Moscow sun was hot, and beat 
through the glass pavilion’s floor to ceiling windows relentlessly during the day. Halpert 
remembers that the heat inside the pavilion was intense, and not particularly conducive to an art 
exhibition—“what with a metal roof and a huge mass of people…the canvasses buckled and the 
metal sculptures were about to melt and the guides and I were ready to collapse.”103 Despite the 
stifling heat, the crowds still pushed in, curious to see this provocative show of American 
culture. The sound of hundreds of voices, coupled with sound from the TV and radio 
demonstrations, would have echoed across the pavilion—the temporary walls and open structure 
of the Jungle Gym were hardly soundproof.104 
 The cage-like structure of the Jungle Gym was employed for practical reasons—it was easy 
to ship the pieces overseas and then construct them in Moscow. However, this structure is also a 
significant example of modern exhibition technique. As George Nelson wrote, these type of 
display structures had not only recently come into being because they were practical, but because 
“there has been a change in our feelings about space and how it should be handled…The need to 
be practical doesn’t exist, the necessity to build inexpensively does. The designer can ease up a 
bit and enjoy himself. The result can be fun. It is surprising how often it is significant fun.”105 
This change in ways of dealing with space was a driving force of modern architecture and design 
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during Nelson’s time, and this disregard for convention and practicality; this, “significant fun” is 
what made the use of this particular design successful in a propaganda effort like the American 
National Exhibition.  
 The cage display system was a relatively new phenomenon in the field of exhibition design, 
and had become popular for traveling exhibitions because of the flexibility that the cage 
structures permitted. The cage exhibition system was a modern product of display, with roots 
firmly planted in methods of avant-garde art installation techniques. 
 The Jungle Gym brings to mind the “L and T” system of display first developed by 
Frederick Kiesler in the 1920s. Kiesler, a German-American artist and architect was an 
influential figure in the American modern art scene, and was well known for his boundary-
pushing exhibition strategies. Kiesler created the L and T system with the goal of allowing works 
of art to come off the gallery wall and into the space of the viewer. The system was made up of 
interconnecting “L” and “T” beams that held up rectangular panels that would support the art. 
The system was freestanding and easily rearranged, it was, as Staniszewski writes, “a new 
ideological scaffolding” upon which exhibition design could build.106 Kiesler’s work was driven 
by the idea of “correalism,” a term that he coined which “expressed his belief in the integral 
relationship between each object and its environment.…” In addition, he believed that for the art 
gallery there must be a design, “that would make conducive a meeting between painting and 
visitor.” 107 For Kiesler, the interaction of the viewer to the display was highly important, and his 
exhibition designs hinged on the idea that the display should be dependent on the viewer for the 
creation of meaning within the exhibition. The design of the Jungle Gym shares with the L and T 
system many formal properties, which are especially apparent in a comparison of the Jungle 
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Gym to City in Space, Kiesler’s 1925 architectural model and exhibition display. These formal 
properties imbued the exhibition with a sense of space that was flexible and unlimited.  
 Furthermore, both Kiesler and Nelson were concerned with the relationship of the viewer to 
the space of display. In their designs, they use the display of art and objects to construct a 
specific environment and viewing experience. Beyond this, Nelson was acutely aware that the 
space of display was a space of persuasion. He saw the art of display as an “essential procedure” 
that always involved “attracting attention.” He realized that, “The great bulk of display, in this 
unromantic age of ours, is designed to persuade someone to buy something he may or may not 
need or want.”108 In the context of the American National Exhibition, what was being “sold” was 
a particular way of life—that of a free, American, capitalist society. The cage structure, designed 
by Nelson and his team to best display the multitude of consumer goods and examples of 
American culture, was meant to promote this way of life by influencing the experience of the 
visitor in the space of the exhibition. This notion that interaction between the display and the 
visitor would create something more—like Kiesler argued, a creation of “meaning,”—was not 
just a utopian hope of the avant-garde, but was recognized in the design of the American 
National Exhibition as an opportunity for persuasion.  
 While the persuasion and propaganda motives of the American National Exhibition were in 
many ways obvious and explicit to those who visited the exhibition—clearly a specific way of 
life was being promoted in the proliferation of American consumer goods—there were more 
subtle power dynamics at work in the very design of the Jungle Gym.  One of the most 
significant elements of the Jungle Gym was its space and openness. Made up of two stories of 
multiple different exhibits, the structure did not have rooms and walls, but rather employed 
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sheets of plastic and bars of aluminum and steel to delineate the space. This allowed little 
separation between the exhibits and the visitors. In a guidebook written for the exhibition, the 
Jungle Gym is described as creating “mezzanine areas from which the visitor may observe 
exhibits above, below, and from the same level on which he stands.”109 The cage-like structure 
emphasized the intense proliferation of American material goods that were on display, and 
enhanced the visitor’s view of these goods, so that even when they were looking at one section of 
the exhibit, the next was never far from their field of vision. In addition, those viewing the 
exhibit could see and hear their fellow visitors quite easily, the mezzanine areas allowing people 
to not only observe the others in their own section, or on their own floor, but also to look down 
on people and exhibitions from above. This lack of separation between exhibits and people 
created a democratization of experience, magnifying and multiplying effect in both what visitors 
saw and how they reacted.  
 Exhibitions are, at their essence, public spaces, and in public spaces, people act differently 
than they would in private.110 This occurs because of many factors, but most importantly the 
physical space and the presence of other people govern the way a person—or group of people— 
will behave. These things affect the way an exhibition is understood and experienced. In this 
instance, the reaction of one person to any part of the exhibition would be easily seen by another, 
and therefore enhance the interest and discussion around what was being displayed. In Andrew 
Wulf’s analysis of the American National Exhibition, he makes an important parallel between 
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Nelson’s design, and perhaps the most influential national exhibition of all—the Great 
Exhibition of 1851, which was housed in Paxton’s famous glass structure, the “Crystal Palace.” 
The Great Exhibition of 1851 featured exhibits from many different countries and is the first 
example of what would become the World’s Fair. Wulf writes that although the Jungle Gym can 
be understood strictly as modern design, influenced by modern display techniques, “Nelson 
himself admitted the seeming avant-gardism of which he and design peers like the Eames and 
others were offering the world at the time were truly predated by earlier exhibitions, including 
the Great Exhibition of 1851”111  
Although created more than 100 years prior to the American National Exhibition, the 
elements of the Crystal Palace are echoed in the space of the Glass Pavilion and the Jungle Gym. 
The Crystal Palace was a magnificent architectural achievement, a multi-storied structure made 
up of rods of iron and walls of glass. The central transept was large and rectangular, creating an 
open gallery that rose high above the main floor. Balconies surrounded the gallery on all sides, 
constructed within the cage-like frame. George Nelson called the Crystal Palace a “prefabricated 
cage enclosing people, gardens and interior structures.”112 This “prefabricated cage” was the 
original predecessor to what would become the classic World’s Fair exhibition style; it set a 
precedent for impermanent and flexible systems of display that were ideal for temporary 
exhibitions like the American National Exhibition.  
 The structure of the Crystal Palace, its architecture so influential to later international 
exhibitions (as well as a multitude of other public buildings such as museums, galleries, and 
department stores), exerted a certain amount of power upon the visitor. In Tony Bennet’s 
Exhibitionary Complex, he seeks to analyze the architecture of the Crystal Palace to “unravel the 
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relations between knowledge and power effected by the technologies of vision embodied in the 
architectural forms of the exhibitionary complex.” In Bennet’s analysis, he engages Foucault, 
arguing that the surveillance mechanisms that were a part of society were present in the 
exhibition, and these “new forms of spectacle produced a more complex and nuanced set of 
relations through which power was exercised and relayed…than the Foucauldian account 
allows.”113 A main component of Bennet’s argument hinges upon an analysis of the architectural 
space. He writes that “one of the architectural innovations of the Crystal Palace consisted in the 
arrangement of relations between the public and exhibits so that, while everyone could see, there 
were also vantage points from which everyone could be seen, thus combining the functions of 
spectacle and surveillance.”114 Ultimately, in examining the relationship between power and 
knowledge at play in the exhibition space, the power lies in the space’s “ability to coordinate an 
order of things and to produce a place for the people in relation to that order.”115 This ordering of 
space and objects that occurred in the Crystal Palace was markedly similar to the space of the 
open, cage-structure of the Jungle Gym. In addition, the power dynamics are arguably similar, 
existing because of the architectural framework of the space. 
 The Jungle Gym, in its chaotic, yet ordered display of materials, was not only effective 
because of the cage structure, but also relied on the visual strategy of bombardment. Inside of the 
glass pavilion, the viewer experienced sensory overload, a complete saturation of perception. 
Everywhere they looked, objects and information could be found. This experience was facilitated 
by the multi-tiered, open structure, and in addition, can be understood as a sort of visual 
photomontage technique. Like the monumental photomontages of Lissitzky, Bayer, and 
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Terragni, George Nelson’s design for the American National Exhibition employed this modern 
method of bombardment of enormous images. Instead of still images, visitors were inundated 
with visions of material consumer goods ensconced in a cage of modern design. Freedom of 
choice was the order of the day, the exhibition built to facilitate ease of movement and maximum 
possibility for viewing each different exhibit.  
 Inside of Buckminster Fuller’s golden geodesic dome, the bombardment continued, this 
time in the form of projected film images. The dome was intended to be viewed first, as “Act I” 
of the exhibition. In contrast to the glass pavilion, the dome was meant to provide information, 
rather than display objects. The information provided in the dome focused on American 
technological advances, education, research, medicine, agriculture, space exploration, and 
nuclear energy. This all came together in a 12-minute, multi-screened film installation created by 
Charles and Ray Eames. The film, Glimpses of the USA was played on a loop, with the lights 
inside the dome dimming at regular intervals so that the seven, 20x30-foot screens could play the 
film, which was made up of 2,200 individual images and included scenes of a typical day in the 
life of an American citizen. Charles and Ray Eames were brought onto the American National 
Exhibition design team by George Nelson, and their experience with creating various multi-
screened slide shows and films, influenced the decision to include one at the American National 
Exhibition. 116 
 The film was meant to pick up where the exhibit left off, and intercede in the Soviet 
imagination in a way that the rest of the display could not. As George Nelson said, there was a 
worry that even with 80,000 square feet of exhibition space, the designers would still not be able 
                                                
116 Nelson and the Eames’ worked together on an art curriculum at the University of Georgia called “Art X,” which 
like Glimpes of the USA, was concerned with the way that design could be used for maximum communication. 
Masey writes that “the idea was to build, through the onrush of different elements, an awareness of potential 
relationships between things that would otherwise be considered unrelated” (Masey, Cold War Confrontations, 165).  
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to “communicate more than a small fraction of what we wanted to say.” The film would provide 
a chance to synthesize and effectively compress “into a small volume the tremendous quantity of 
information we wanted to present.”117 In addition to the rest of the exhibition, the designers used 
this film to harness the power of images to impart a particular message about life in the United 
States. The film, unlike the objects and still images that made up other sections of the exhibition, 
had the unique ability to capture the attention of the viewer with moving images (that had the 
benefit of portraying real Americans using real American products), sound, sheer size, and an 
audacity of display that employed not just a single, straight screen, but seven massive ones.  
 Originally, when the design team presented the initial plans for the dome and the film to the 
USIA, they received a lukewarm reaction. George Nelson remembers that there were concerns 
that the dome as an “information machine” would not be “sufficiently dramatic.” He noted that 
there was “Considerable pressure to follow conventional exhibition procedures, which would 
mean glass pavilion would be stuffed with one set of objects, dome equally stuffed with 
another.” The design team however, advocated for an appreciable difference between the two 
main buildings of the exhibit, arguing, that “if acts one and two are identical, people leave the 
theater…” The design for the dome and the film was eventually accepted, but Nelson recalled 
that there was “alarm and disapproval of the idea of a multiple-screen presentation in the dome 
as its major exhibit.”118 Though the designers had faith in the impact and power of their proposed 
display, it is interesting that this power of display did not initially translate to the USIA officials. 
This instance highlights the influence that the designers had on the decision making process. 
Although the designs needed to be approved and discussed with the USIA, it was the designers 
who were ultimately responsible for creating the unique display of communication that the 
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exhibit would manifest. Peter Blake, who was in charge of the architecture exhibit in Moscow, 
remembered that it was Jack Masey, head of design decisions for the USIA, who pushed for 
avant-garde, cutting edge designers to be hired. As Blake writes, “Charles and Ray were hardly 
in the mainstream of American culture. They were very much ‘on the cutting edge’; and for a 
staid U.S. government agency to commission two such unpredictable experimenters to produce 
what was to be the theme song of our exhibition was mind-boggling.”119 In the case of Glimpses 
of the USA, the design was finally accepted not because the designers impressed upon the 
government officials the impact of the multi-screened film, but because the officials decided that 
presenting videos that depicted real, everyday American people using the various products and 
technologies that were displayed in the exhibit would be an effective way to make credible the 
claim that these products were used by the majority of the American public.  
 When the film was installed in Moscow, however, the overall visual impact was 
indisputable. Every so often, the lights of the dome were dimmed, the screens were illuminated, 
and visions of the American experience were projected from the seven screens that were situated 
high above the crowd, close to the ceiling of the dome. The images moved quickly, to the tune of 
triumphant orchestral music written by Leonard Bernstein. One New York Times writer called 
Glimpses of the USA the “dome’s most dramatic message,” which was “transmitted through an 
ingenious film device.”120 The images provided “glimpses” into American life, portraying cities, 
highways filled with cars, farms and countryside, skyscrapers, multitudes of Americans on their 
way to work or school, or enjoying leisure time.  
 The specific combination of images, as well as the speed that they were cycled through, 
provided the film with a narrative arc, and emphasized certain points more than others. For the 
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most part, the scenes were “flashed in sequence” but, “sometimes, for special impact, all at 
once.”121 For example, the film begins with images of the night stars displayed across the seven 
screens. Gradually, the images on each screen change, and the stars morph into views of cities 
seen from the sky. The narrator tells the audience that, “from the sky it would be difficult to 
distinguish the Russian city from the American city.”122 Images of scenic American vistas are 
followed by views of cities, skyscrapers, and neighborhoods, birds-eye views of pools and cul-
de-sacs. The music gets faster, and the images change quickly in time with this soundtrack until a 
wall of image and sound inundates the viewer’s senses.  
 These thousands of images thrown at the viewer in quick succession, created a visual field 
that was impossible to escape. As Peter Blake writes, “The thousands of images chosen by 
Charles and Ray each told a direct story and a subliminal one, the latter being what it was like to 
live in a free capitalist society.”123 The seven-screened set up was considered carefully by the 
Eameses, the number of images shown had to be enough for high visual impact, but not too 
many that the display became incomprehensible. Seven proved to be just the right number to 
both allow for understanding of what was shown, with maximum visual impact still intact. 
Ultimately, Glimpses of the USA would be described by one reporter as a “twelve-minute blitz,” 
an “information overload—an avalanche of related data that comes at a viewer too fast for him to 
cull and reject it…”124 This feeling of a “blitz,” came from the unique set up of gigantic screens 
that confronted the viewer’s field of vision.  
 This method of display was deeply rooted in ideas that were first put forth by avant-garde 
artists and designers. In their work, Charles and Ray Eames, highly influential modern designers 
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in their own right, were influenced by these earlier designers. Additionally, the design 
philosophies and goals of Charles and Ray Eames were particularly concerned with ways of 
communicating through both product design and multi-screened presentations like Glimpses of 
the USA. It was the display of images that was deemed to have the ultimate power of 
communication, more so than words ever could. As Charles Eames remembers, “when we used 
seven screens over an area that was over half the length of a football field—that was just a 
desperate attempt to make a credible statement to a group of people in Moscow when words had 
almost ceased to have meaning.” The designers found that in an earlier prototype that relied on a 
more traditional linear film style, they “couldn’t really give credibility” to the message. Rather, 
they discovered that there was a unique power in the multi-screened and many imaged display, 
as Eames said, “when we could put 50 images on the screen for a certain subject in a matter of 
10 seconds, we got a kind of breadth which we felt we couldn’t get any other way.”125  
 In many ways, Glimpses of the USA is reminiscent of the oversized photomontages that 
were featured in the European propaganda exhibitions of the 1930s. Like photomontage, 
Glimpses of the USA takes a simple and traditional element of visual communication—the 
photograph (or in this case a moving image), and employs this single element in combination 
with others to form a new, innovative, and impactful whole. The photomontage is a visual 
bombardment, a mashing together of images to create new meaning and in this case, a 
propaganda message. The quickly moving images of Glimpses of the USA is nothing but a 
photomontage put into film, as the film takes simple images and uses them to saturate and 
bombard the viewer’s field of vision. As the Eameses said, “if for example, we were to show a 
freeway interchange, somebody would look at it and say, ‘We have one at Smolensk and one at 
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Minsk; we have two, they have one’—that kind of thing. So we conceived the idea of having the 
imagery come on in multiple forms….”126 The singular image of a highway, skyscraper, or 
suburban home has little visual power on its own, but when displayed in quickly changing scenes 
on oversized screens, these images take on new meaning in their relentless multiplicity, as the 
film bombards the viewer’s field of vision.  
 The idea of the “field of vision” in exhibition design was first put forth by Herbert Bayer, 
and is used to great effect in the installation and display of Glimpses of the USA. Bayer first 
conceptualized the notion of a “field of vision” in 1930, and it was a theory that would continue 
to guide the design of all of his subsequent exhibitions. In his book Display, George Nelson 
describes Bayer’s idea as a “simple and obvious” concept, “if display material is related to the 
height and angle of a person’s vision, more can be seen simultaneously and with greater ease…” 
More importantly, he continues, this display “gave to the exhibition a new three-dimensional 
device which changed its entire character and offered new opportunities for gaining attention.”127 
In Bayer’s field of vision, the work of art was not relegated to flat gallery walls, yet like 
Kiesler’s L and T system, allowed what was being displayed to come into the space of the 
viewer, surrounding them and engulfing their line of vision. Additionally, Bayer equated 
exhibition design to the “psychology of advertising.” Similarly to Nelson’s statement that the 
design of display is at its heart meant to be persuasive, Bayer stated that the theme of the 
exhibition should not “retain its distance from the spectator, it should be brought close to him, 
penetrate and leave an impression on him, should explain, demonstrate, and even persuade and 
lead him to a planned and direct reaction.”128 Bayer’s concept of display allowed for better and 
                                                
126 quoted in Colomina, “Enclosed by Images,” 19. 
127 Nelson, Display, 110. 
128 quoted in La, "Enlightenment, Advertising, Education, Etc," 68.  
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more effective viewing—searching for methods of display that would lead to a meaningful 
experience for the viewer. In the multi-screened set up of Glimpses of the USA, the Eames-
Nelson design team were aiming for exactly that. The installation of the film, the screens 
elevated as they were high above the crowd on the curved wall of the dome, echoes Bayer’s 
diagram of the 360 degree field of vision, with the panels of display surrounding the audience.  
 Though an “expanded field of vision” like the one employed in Glimpses of the USA, might 
at first seem to be a more democratic form of display, upon second glance, it is clear that this 
form of display dominates the viewer in a way that does not allow for other thoughts or opinions. 
As Kristie La argues, the expanded field of vision that Bayer formulated, “intensified the drama 
of the exhibition, relentlessly firing photographs at the viewer from all angles, so that he could 
only be in ‘the thick of it’—so there could be no outside. Despite its radical surface, expanded 
vision in Bayer’s use is conservative at heart, producing a passive spectator under the guise of an 
active one.”129 Among the impressive architecture of the dome, and the other exhibits displayed 
there, Glimpses of the USA was a grandiose and monumental grab for attention, the images 
bombarding visitors with proof of the success of American infrastructure and technology. 
 In the design of exhibition space, the designer holds an inherent authority over the visitors to 
the exhibition. This holds true for each of the elements of the American National Exhibition 
examined here; in the art gallery, the Jungle Gym, and the dome. The visitor must travel through 
the space created by the designer, and in doing so they are following a premeditated plan. 
However loosely this plan may have been designed to actually control a visitor’s movement, the 
design of a space always exerts influence over a visitor’s understanding and experience of the 
space. Whether the original intent is made explicitly clear, or is more subtle, going unnoticed by 
                                                
129 Ibid 
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the conscious mind of the visitor, the design of an exhibition is at its essence is concerned with 
the ordering not only of objects in space, but of the body in space.  This creates a dynamic of 
power—in making their design considerations, the designer leaves visual cues and manipulates 
physical space so that the viewer will walk one way, or see one object in relation to the one next 
to it.  
 In looking at design that was chosen for this power to persuade, it is not the ultimate 
experience that matters, but the designer’s intent of creating a particular, manufactured 
experience that does. It was this intent that was sought after in the creation of the American 
National Exhibition. The design process always begins with a problem, to which the designer 
must create a solution. In the case of the American National Exhibition the problem was to 
generate a persuasive display of American culture that would stand up to the charged atmosphere 
of Cold War and send a particular message to the Soviet visitors. The designers of the exhibition 
found the solution in techniques and philosophies grounded in avant-garde installation methods 
first put forth by El Lissitzky, Fredrick Kiesler and Herbert Bayer. As George Nelson writes, the 
designer, “brings to the problem his own private baggage, his personal collection of images and 
the individual philosophy he holds whether he is aware of it or not.” In addition, “no design can 
exist in isolation. It is always related, sometimes in very complex ways, to an entire constellation 
of influencing situations and attitudes.”130 George Nelson’s own philosophy, so influenced by 
modernism and the tenets of Herbert Bayer and the Bauhaus, was reflected in his effort to craft a 
total environment, in which meaning and persuasion were created.  
 
                                                
130 George Nelson, Problems of Design (Whitney Publications, 1957), 11. 
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Figure 14 
A woman examines Jackson Pollock’s Cathedral. 
The American National Exhibition 
Moscow, 1959 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 
Visitors to the art gallery pass Jack 
Levine’s Welcome Home. 
 
The American National Exhibition 
Moscow, 1959 
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Figure 16 
Crowds in the gallery. 
The American National Exhibition 
Moscow, 1959 
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Figure 17 
Crowds in the gallery. 
The American National Exhibition 
Moscow, 1959 
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Figures 18 and 19 
Second floor mezzanine of the Jungle Gym 
The American National Exhibition 
Moscow, 1959 
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Figure 21 
City in Space 
Frederick Kiesler 
1925 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20 
Rendering of 
Kiesler’s L + T 
system. 
 
Vienna, 
1924 
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Figures 22 and 23 
Glimpses of the USA 
Charles and Ray Eames 
The American National Exhibition 
Moscow, 1959 
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Figure 24 
Extended Field of Vision 
Bayer 
1935 
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Conclusion 
A Historical Paradox in Visual Form  
 
“In these exhibition systems, organizing and disseminating information  
(and thus the modern concept of emancipation through access to information)  
becomes an organizational endeavor with all of the administrative  
precision and hierarchical integration of a modern industrialized 
corporation, military apparatus, or totalitarian state.”131  
 
“design is a professional euphemism for control over people and things,  
a euphemism that is, for power.”132  
 
In 2007, contemporary artist Martin Beck produced a video work that took as its subject 
the groundbreaking “Struc-Tube” exhibition system designed by George Nelson. The “Struc-
Tube” system, easily produced and put together with connecting tubes and joints, was a 
predecessor to the system used in Moscow in 1959. Beck titled the work About the Relative Size 
of Things in The Universe, a nod to the subtitle of Charles and Ray Eames’ film Powers of Ten: 
A Film Dealing with the Relative Size of Things in the Universe and the Effect of Adding Another 
Zero. Beck’s video is a loop of a man and a woman assembling and disassembling the Struc-
Tube system. In lieu of being able to watch the video here, a critic of the exhibition provides a 
description: 
“An orderly stack of metal modular tubing and display panels is approached by a man 
and a woman, who together begin efficiently constructing an obviously temporary 
structure…They are interrupted by a third player, who asks whether they will be able to 
come to a meeting the next day, in order to discuss workers’ rights. Unable to commit, 
the man and woman attempt to keep at their job while explaining that they have another 
exhibition to put up tomorrow; they’ll likely miss the meeting. They complete their task, 
and the camera holds a wide dilated gaze until the workers begin taking the structure 
apart, all the while retaining their pace and steadiness. They are interrupted a second time 
by the dissident worker, who repeats his request for a meeting. He is again put off; the 
structure is cleanly disassembled as the camera returns to its original position until the 
scenario beings again.”133 
                                                
131 Martin Beck, “Sovereignty and Control,” in Martin Beck: About the Relative Size of Things in the Universe, 
2007, 58. 
132 quoted in Felicity Scott, “On the ‘Counter-Design’of Institutions: Emilio Ambasz’s Universitas Symposium at 
MoMA,” Grey Room, No. 14 (Winter 2004), 65. 
133 Johanna Burton, “Martin Beck,” Art Forum, September 2007, 469. 
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Beck is fascinated by the struc-tube system. In his work he addresses it in other forms as well, 
using reconstructions of the system for both the exhibition of his own work, and as his own 
work. In a review of one of his recent exhibitions, David Everitt Howe writes that in Beck’s 
work he is, “Laying bare the appropriation and re-articulation of the avant-garde as a design 
language, infinitely reproducible….he invokes impassioned political debates around art historical 
movements and their larger cultural contexts only to relegate them to a kind of modernist décor. 
Historical baggage is both evoked and buried in surface sheen, complementary to his exhibition 
design and somehow mutually at odds with it.”134 In using the struc-tube system as a topic and a 
medium in his art, Beck privileges form as a way of understanding greater social and historical 
currents. For example, this exhibition system was the first system that could be assembled 
without a single tool, easily put together anywhere by unskilled workers. In About the Relative 
Size of Things in the Universe, Beck takes this idea as a point of departure for exploring 
contemporary labor relations. In his work, an examination of the struc-tube system becomes “a 
methodological apparatus within a broader framework of artistic practice.”135  
Additionally, for Beck, the exhibition system is a place where “the utopian vision of 
infinite dissemination of information (expandability, portability) and… the administration of this 
utopia by a means of a rigid geometry” come together.136 In the recognition of this comparison 
he identifies the inherent complication that exists in this system of display, the freedom and 
liberation that is assumed in the flexibility and modernism of the form, yet the simultaneous 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
134 David Everitt Howe, “Contentious Utopias: Martin Beck’s Avant-Garde Art and Design,” Afterall, January 10, 
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135 Martin Beck, The Industrialization of Display Systems, Email Interview, 2008, 22. http://adsz.hfg-
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authority that is created in the highly structured grid system. In researching the history of modern 
exhibition design that is exemplified by the struc-tube, Beck takes the historical moment of the 
late twentieth century and uses the struc-tube as a “methodological apparatus” to understand, in 
his words, how “two apparently contradictory movements interact” within this structure.137 In 
Beck’s work, the struc-tube “functions as a kind of homogenous sign that is capable of 
translating a historical paradox into visual form—the paradox being the way emancipatory 
scenarios and control apparatuses mutually produce and condition each other.”138  
 Martin Beck’s work addresses many of the questions that are explored in this thesis, most 
centrally the importance of the role of the visual form in analysis of history and society. This 
perspective includes the appropriation of modern and avant-garde techniques, as well as the 
complex relationship between the promotion of freedom and simultaneous regulation that is 
found in the exhibit space. He finds this relationship so well articulated in the “modular exhibit 
system and its emblem, the connector joint,” which, “are at the heart of a paradox that 
continuously haunts modernity’s utopias: they liberate as they regulate and they regulate as they 
liberate.”139 In his work, Beck adds to the current intellectual work in the field of art history and 
analyzing exhibition design. As he appropriates a form that was once itself appropriated, and 
presents it to contemporary viewers, he creates an alternative mode of understanding the history 
and implications of this piece of design. He brings historical and social questions into the art 
world, into the gallery, and offers a new way of seeing. In the synthesis of design, history, and 
art-making that this piece creates, Beck makes clear that it is the analysis and interrogation of 
form that allows us to begin to ask questions about meaning.  
                                                
137 Ibid, 21 
138 Ibid  
139 Quoted in Benoît Buquet, “Portrait. Martin Beck,” Critique d’art. Actualité internationale de la littérature 
critique sur l’art contemporain, no. 40 (November 1, 2012).  
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 In the case of the American National Exhibition in 1959, this concept is crucial to our 
understanding of the event. The structure of the architecture and design of the exhibition was the 
medium through which this cultural and political persuasion was enacted. The USIA, Jack 
Masey, and George Nelson knew that it was not only the multitude of objects displayed that 
would have impact on the viewer. Most importantly, it was the method used to display these 
objects that made the exhibition instrumental to the promotion of American ideology.  
 The combination of cultural and political power that creates meaning in the exhibition 
takes concrete form when politicians inhabit the exhibition space, as shown in a photograph of 
Nixon and Khrushchev visiting the exhibition on its opening day. The composition of the 
photograph allows us to imagine what it might be like to be a visitor at the exhibition; the space 
is simultaneously a baazar—filled with light, color, sound, objects—and a political arena. If our 
eyes become the photographer’s lens, we stand on the ground floor and look upward. In front of 
us a display features American music and sound recording technology. A column of high fidelity 
records hangs from the ceiling among the bars and panels of the steel cage system of display. 
Many bright lights illuminate the display. It is an eclectic mix of Americana, jazz by Thelonious 
Monk, next to a record of folk songs by famed poet Carl Sandburg. The square shapes of the 
record covers echo the scaffolding system of the exhibit, and our eyes are drawn upward by the 
multiple vertical lines created by the metal bars of the display as well as the vertical orientation 
of the objects being displayed. Above the display, the bars of the balcony continue to carry our 
gaze upward, until they stop at the top of the frame, near the roof, finally resting on the group of 
politicians. Standing on the second floor balcony, they tower above us, as does the heavy 
industrial structure of the Jungle Gym. Nixon leans on the railing of the mezzanine balcony, a 
smug expression on his face, staring off at the display below him. Next to him is Khrushchev, 
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who is making a move as if to grab Nixon’s arm to get his attention. Nixon is tall, with dark hair 
and a dark suit, Khrushchev is shorter, with a balding, white-haired head, and a light grey suit. 
The pair are opposites, embodying their antagonistic roles as the figureheads of the communism 
versus capitalism debate. 
 In one shot, the photographer captured the layered and multifaceted power dynamics at 
play in the 1959 American National Exhibition. The cadre of grey-suited diplomats that fill the 
balcony, above the display and simultaneously on display, are an obvious reminder of the high 
political stakes under which the exhibition was conceived. The meshing of culture and politics at 
the heart of the entire event comes to life here, as the politicians (who would later that week 
partake in the famous “kitchen debate”) engage with the cultural exhibit, an exhibit that was 
meant not only to awe and impress, but use the power of the visual to persuade and instruct 
Russian visitors in the ways of modern American life in a capitalist, free, and democratic society.  
 It was the artists of the early twentieth-century avant-garde whose influence is so strongly 
seen in this photograph and throughout Sokolniki Park---in the glass pavilion, the Jungle Gym, 
the white cube, the geodesic dome, and the Eameses multi-screened film. However, the 
modernism on display in Moscow in 1959 was a modernism divorced from the original intent of 
the avant-garde. As Greg Barnhisel writes, “it was American modernism in art, literature, music, 
architecture, and even dance that served as evidence of American cultural advancement—but this 
was a modernism redefined and made safe for official sponsorship.”140 The utopian ideologies of 
the avant-garde powered the creation of the American National Exhibition, but in the 
appropriation of these forms for state-sponsored propaganda, the existing definition and 
                                                
140 Greg Barnhisel, “Perspectives USA and the Cultural Cold War: Modernism in Service of the State,” 
Modernism/modernity 14, no. 4 (November 2007): 730. 
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understanding of modernism, and “avant-garde” were redefined in order make room for the 
promotion of democratic ideologies.  
 As we have seen, modern art and design were particularly well suited to the propaganda 
mission. The idealism and abstraction that characterized so much of the philosophies of avant-
garde artists and designers was easily coopted in service of a specific message. Stuart Hobbs 
writes, “the meaning that avant-gardists gave to their work, which they believed was expressed 
in a form that tapped into a universal human subconscious, proved susceptible to diverse 
interpretations.” 141 For example, highly influential critics such as Clement Greenberg framed and 
interpreted the work of modern artists like the New York school as they saw fit. Greenberg was 
known for his formalism, which identified the form of the artwork as its most important 
characteristic.  
While an examination of form can expose meaning, a singular focus on the formal 
properties of a work of art, outside of any contextual framework can do just the opposite, 
obscuring the context in which the art was created and opening the door for the addition of 
meaning by outside sources. This is exactly what happened in the art gallery at the American 
National exhibition, where much of the art included was modern and abstract, and displayed in 
the decontextualizing white cube. The proclivity of modern artists to demonstrate universality in 
their art paved the way for easy interpretation and redefinition by outside actors – critics, 
curators, and government officials. This openness to interpretation is what allowed modern art to 
be appropriated for political use. The act of this appropriation also highlights totalitarian 
tendencies that existed in the methods of American cultural diplomacy. 
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 In participating in this appropriation of a specific style of avant-garde in the American 
National exhibition, the United States government used practices that were cultivated by what we 
see today as “classical” totalitarian states such as Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Stalin’s 
Soviet Union. The United States government participated in actions that emulated totalitarian 
practices when they created a propaganda exhibit so similar in style to those found in less 
democratic regimes. Consequently, the American National Exhibition, though promoting 
freedom, was not necessarily a free and democratic space. This had everything to do with the 
appropriation of art and design by government powers with specific propaganda goals in mind, 
and the design’s power to convey these goals and create a space of power and persuasion. In the 
creation of this space, true freedom of opinion did not exist. 
 The story of the American government’s appropriation of culture during the Cold War, is 
one of paradoxes and ironies. In the United States, modern American art was simultaneously a 
beacon of independence and freedom and the worst kind of communist scribbling. In the Soviet 
Union it was condemned as a symbol of the degradation of the capitalist system. The American 
National exhibition took place during the extreme polarization of the Cold War. It was a cultural 
manifestation of good versus evil. Capitalism versus communism. Democracy and freedom 
versus totalitarianism. It was a story of strange bedfellows: government agencies and modern 
artists and designers. At the outset, these opposites seem forever opposed, with one eventually 
triumphing over the other. However, upon closer examination these contradictions are fluid, co-
existing in never-ending tension. The American National Exhibition was not only a triumph of 
propaganda, an unquestioned promotion of the American dream and democracy. The United 
States was not on the democratic side of the equation simply because democracy was the product 
being sold. George Nelson’s Jungle Gym was not a playground of commercial choice, but rather 
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a highly structured and hierarchical space. Edith Halpert’s art gallery was anything but a 
“neutral” white cube. The Eameses’ film did not offer a democracy of images, but rather an all-
encompassing blitz of carefully sequenced scenes of persuasion. We can come to these 
conclusions by considering the space in which cultural propaganda was created. By taking into 
account the visual format of the exhibition style, these seeming paradoxes and tensions can be 
interrogated and redefined, and slowly, the one-dimensional story of American cultural 
diplomacy changes. 
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Figures 25 and 26 
About the Relative Size of Things in the Universe 
Martin Beck 
2007 
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